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Abstract 
How do national tax regimes and political institutions affect EU member states’ attractiveness 
to foreign investors? Many scholars have researched tax regimes and FDI and political 
institutions and FDI, but often in isolation. In this thesis, I replicate the findings of Gropp and 
Kostial (2000), and expand their analysis by including important political variables. By 
looking at 21 EU member states over 15 years (1998-2012), I use panel data analysis to show 
that institutions matter for investors, and that government output and general activity is 
important when investors choose where to invest. In particular, the amount of motorway and 
infrastructure in the EU member states is an important indicator in this respect. This thesis 
brings two additions to the existing literature, one methodological, and one substantial. 
 
Methodologically, I will show that model specifications in many ways determine the outcome 
of the analysis, and that scholars need to challenge their data in order to obtain robust results. 
I follow the strand of Beck and Katz (2001) by using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) analysis 
with Panel-Corrected Standard Errors (PCSE). This is truly important when using short time-
series, as most FDI-related analyses are, because other research methods such as Feasible 
Generalized Least Squares (FGLS) and regular OLS have a tendency to underestimate the 
standard errors and give the scholars over-confident results.  
 
Substantially, I will show that political scientists and economists should work more together 
to get a better understanding of FDI, as qualitative (and quantitative) research in the social 
sciences can understand the political environment in a better way than many economists, and 
this thesis shows that political and economic variables both affect countries’ attractiveness in 
FDI.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Figure 1 Apple iPhone 5S (Copyright Apple Inc.) 
 
 “Designed by Apple in California. Assembled in China.” – the text on the backside of 
every iPhone Apple has produced. While all parts of the production chain some 
decades ago were usually located in the same region, todays enterprises try to increase 
the efficiency of every part of the production chain. One part of this is the location of 
their investments. In a globalized world, the physical distance between markets is of 
lesser importance than ever. Production costs are today at a level where a company can 
manufacture, assemble, sell, and provide service to, a product in all different parts of 
the world. These companies, the Multinational Enterprises (MNEs), have grown to be 
a big part of the world economy, and as a consequence, a big part of the research from 
students of International Business (IB) and International Political Economy (IPE).  
 
The continued liberalization of the markets in the world in the last decades has led to 
an ever more integrated framework of the financial markets in the world (OECD, 
2009, p. 14). In this development, Foreign Direct Investments (FDIs) has played a 
central role. By establishing long lasting links between countries, enterprises and 
economies, FDI can contribute to economic growth in both home and host countries. 
OECD lists many positive aspects of FDI, in particular the transfer of knowledge and 
technology, and the possibility for economic growth in both the home and host 
economy, given that the correct policy environment (OECD, 2009, p. 14). There are, 
of course, some negative aspects of FDI activity as well, and history has shown that 
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exploitation of natural resources and countries has come with the introduction of 
foreign investors. However, this thesis is not devoted to the ethical consequences of 
FDI for neither home nor host countries, but how certain policies from governments 
can affect the attractiveness of a potential host economy for FDI.  
 
Figure 2 Annual inward FDI stocks in US Dollars, Current prices and current exchange rates in millions. Source: 
OECD statistics 
 
 
Figure 2 shows that there has been a significant growth in the level of FDI since the 
1980s, in particular in the developed and developing countries. The history of FDI is, 
as we shall see, longer than this, but with the liberalization of the national economies 
in the beginning of the 1980s came a less hostile attitude towards foreign investments. 
Even if this hostility has grown again since the 1980’s, the inwards FDI stocks keep 
rising. As FDI increases, the cross-border capital movement also grows. This growth 
reflects the multitude of enterprises and forms of FDI available. Even though the large 
Multinational Enterprises dominate this development, more small and medium-sized 
enterprises are also involved in FDI (OECD, 2009, p. 14). Growing FDI in the world 
economy means that this form of investment is an important factor in explaining 
economic growth in countries, which makes the field more interesting for scholars 
than ever before. Of course, there are other forms of investments contributing to 
economic growth in the world, with Foreign Portfolio Investment (FPI) standing in 
contrast to FDI, discussed later.  
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The determinants of FDI have been an area of research for many economists and 
political scientists. There are many papers focusing on institutions, natural resources, 
infrastructure or other factors in the intersection between politics and economy. In the 
recent years, there has been a discussion on the importance of a host country’s tax 
regime (see for instance Devereux, Lockwood, & Redoano, 2008; Gropp and Kostial, 
2000; Bénassy-Quéré, Fontagné and Lahrèche-Révil, 2003). Different papers draw 
different conclusions, but there seems to be a consensus in that corporate tax rates, to a 
certain degree, affect the locational decisions of foreign enterprises. Most of these 
analyses came in a period where the European Union discussed what the Commission 
labeled harmful tax competition (European Commission, 1997). Devereux et al, for 
instance, claimed that countries do in fact compete on corporate tax rates, and that this 
leads to a drop in the average corporate tax rate in the OECD countries included in the 
analysis (Devereux, Lockwood, & Redoano, 2008, pp. 1212-1213). This means that if 
the rate of corporate tax is important when a MNE decides whether to invest in a 
country, the competition between countries could be an interesting research question.  
 
Since the outbreak of the financial crisis in 2007/2008, the question of corporate tax 
rates has again been at the forefront of European politics. In 2011, the French 
president Nicolas Sarkozy attacked the Irish taxation level, and meant that Ireland 
could not ask for aid from the EU whilst having the lowest level of corporate income 
tax in the Union (Reilly, 2011). Today, the Commission is still working on the 
question of harmful tax competition, for instance through the work on tax evasion and 
tax avoidance (European Commission, 2013a). Therefore, I want to see how national 
tax regimes affect the host economies’ attractiveness to foreign investors. On the 
question of the financial crisis and how it affected the FDI, I will return to this in 
chapter 3.6.1, discussing how to control for an external shock.  
In this thesis, I will try to explain how host countries’ tax regimes can influence their 
attractiveness to foreign investors, and how this is affected when we include 
institutional quality and good governance in the analyses. To test this, I will first do a 
quantitative and comparative analysis of relevant and possible determinants of FDI. 
Gropp and Kostial (2000) looked at whether the corporate tax rates in the EU member 
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states influenced investments, and their conclusion was that they do. I will replicate 
their findings using updated data (1998-2012). Second, the methodology used in their 
analysis is not necessarily the best model, so I will test their data using an Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS) analysis with Panel-Corrected Standard Errors (PCSE). Third, I 
will include political variables in the analysis, and I expect to see a reduction in the 
importance of the national tax regime, because institutions matter, at least more than 
most tax economists think. While it is not new to look at the relationship between 
taxes and FDI, or institutions and FDI, not many have looked at them at the same time.  
 
I will, in part, base my thesis on earlier research, but I will, where possible, use data 
from the entire EU, as they have gone from EU15 to EU28 since the time Gropp and 
Kostial wrote their paper. As later chapters will show, however, data availability 
restricts this. The biggest difference will be the use of political variables, more than 
macroeconomic ones. Is it so that corporate tax rates are as important as the 
economists claim, or can political characteristics in EU member states give a better 
understanding to the phenomenon of locational decisions in FDI? I claim that the 
political variables in this research question are important, and that they do in fact give 
a better understanding of the relationship between taxes and FDI inflows when 
included in analyses. Since the European Union has discussed tax harmonizing in a 
longer perspective, these analyses become more interesting for political science than 
ever before. There are many political obstacles if the EU wants to harmonize national 
tax regimes, but primarily we should see whether the tax regimes play a role in 
determining whether to invest before we start the long and possibly bumpy ride of tax 
harmonizing in the EU. 
 
My research question is: 
What role does host country taxation regimes play in EU member states when 
attracting foreign direct investments? 
 
But why is this important? There are many research papers already concluding that 
corporate tax rates matters, and that lowering the tax wedge in most cases will increase 
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the inflows of FDI. I have reason to believe that institutional quality matters more than 
earlier research claim, and if that is true, it may have big consequences for the policies 
implemented in the European countries. Also, some scholars have found empirical 
evidence that FDI is more sensitive to institutional quality than domestic investments 
(Aizenman & Spiegel, 2002). If it is so that high institutional quality and good 
governance can compete with low tax rates, there are some EU member states that 
ought to revise their policy reforms, as we indeed have seen a race towards the bottom 
in corporate tax rates over the last decades (see Appendix for statistics).  
 
In the following chapters, I will present hypotheses connected to this research question 
that I will test empirically through a panel data analysis. The role of this thesis is to try 
to give a different perspective to the research on the relationship between national tax 
regimes and FDI, especially through including political variables in the analyses, and 
feasibly give a new and better understanding of the tax regimes in the member states in 
the European Union. In the first part of the thesis, I will define the Multinational 
Enterprise, Foreign Direct Investment and the MNEs motivations for FDI. The 
resource-seeking, market-seeking, efficiency-seeking or asset-seeking motivations 
have played different roles over the years and between countries, and play a significant 
role in the understanding of why enterprises choose to involve themselves in FDI. I 
will give a resume of the discussions of corporate taxation in the EU and whether we 
can see a race for inward FDI in the Union. Before I discuss my theories and variables 
for the regression analyses, I will give an overview of earlier research on this subject 
in the end of this chapter. In chapter 3, I will elaborate on the methodology used in this 
thesis, the design, units and variables. I will describe the challenges and obstacles 
using panel data analysis, and give an explanation to why I choose to measure these 
phenomena as I do. Chapter 4 starts with the panel analysis, where I first replicate the 
analysis by Gropp and Kostial, before I expand the baseline model with political 
variables of relevance. I will run different tests with various indicators and model 
specifications as a test of robustness. In chapter 5 I will analyze the findings from 
chapter 4 and elaborate on the difficulties in the data, as well as giving some 
recommendations for the future, before I give my concluding remarks in chapter 6.  
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1.1. THE MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE 
 
The global level of outward FDI was in 2012 $1.35 trillion, and UNCTAD expects the 
number to be the same in 2013 (UNCTAD, 2013, p. ix). Even though this was a drop 
from 2011, the level of FDI in the world is of enormous proportions. How did the 
foreign direct investments become such a central part of international business? In this 
part of the thesis, I will attempt to draw an outline over the history of the MNE and 
FDI. The history briefly is that of a wish for entities to occupy production and 
transactions outside of their home country (Dunning & Lundan, 2008, p. 145). 
 
Already in 1914, FDI amounted to 9% of the world output, or about 15-18 billion US 
dollars; a level FDI did not reach in the world economy again until the 1990s, but 
since 1980, FDI has outstripped the growth in world GDP and world exports (Dunning 
& Lundan, 2008, pp. 19,189). In 1980, a few, large and developed countries 
dominated the international scene: twelve countries accounted for 94% of the total 
stock of outward direct investment, and of these 94%, the US, the UK, West Germany 
and Netherlands controlled 73% (Dunning & Lundan, 2008, p. 23). 32 years later, the 
same four countries accounted for 40%. (UNCTAD, 2013, p. 217) The increasing 
activity of smaller and medium sized economies is noticeable, and the relative 
importance of the US economy is declining. From the 1970s onwards, more MNEs in 
the developing world emerged, and this happened at the same time as new competitive 
advantages encouraged foreign production (Dunning & Lundan, 2008, p. 28).  
 
The Multinational Enterprise consists of the word multinational1 and enterprise2. The 
former would demand that the enterprise has to control value-added activities in more 
than one country.  OECD defines the enterprise as “an institutional unit engaged in 
production” (OECD, 2009, p. 44). This includes corporations, non-profit corporations 
and unincorporated enterprises. Whereas the OECD speaks about Multinational 
enterprises, the UN uses transnational corporation for the same organizational form 
(UNCTAD, 2013). I will in this thesis use the phrase Multinational Enterprise (MNE).  
                                            
1 I will use the term multinational throughout the thesis. In the literature, the term transnational is also used to 
describe the same phenomenon.  
2 I will use the term enterprise throughout the thesis, in the same meaning as a corporation, a firm or a company. 
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There are many working definitions of the MNE. One could define it as an enterprise 
engaging in FDI (Dunning & Lundan, 2008, p. 3). The MNE distinguishes itself from 
the other forms of organizations (like the international trading firm or the domestic 
multi-activity or diversified firm), in that it engages in cross-border production and 
transactions, whereas the other forms of firms only engages themselves in one of them 
(Dunning & Lundan, 2008, p. 6). The question of control over the foreign enterprise is 
central (Hymer, 1976, p. 1). Usually, one divides between portfolio investment and 
FDI, in that the former is only engaged in the transfer of financial capital, whereas the 
latter is involved in many, if not all, of the value-adding activities, as production, 
manufacturing, technology, cultural norms and other distinct features of a foreign 
country. In addition, there is the degree of power over the investment object – as FDI 
requires a minimum of 10% ownership from the investor (Dunning & Lundan, 2008, 
p. 7; OECD, 2009, p. 23). It is not an easy divide between these forms of investments, 
and the dividing line is bound to be arbitrary. An investor may own more than 10% 
without being able to exercise control over the investment, and another investor may 
own less than 10% and exercise control. A good example of the latter is the 
Norwegian sovereign Pension Fund, which banned the American grocery store Wal-
Mart because of bad ethics in the American company (Landler, 2007). Even though 
the fund owned less than 10%, the fund is such a large investor in the global finance 
business that the decision made the Wal-Mart stock to drop, and the company to 
change their labor policies. Nevertheless, the divide is important for the analysis of 
FDI activity, as the form of ownership may impose consequences for the importance 
of the corporate tax rates in the investment made by the enterprise.  
 
I have briefly touched upon the MNE’s motivations for engaging in FDI. According to 
the existing literature, they can be resource-, market-, efficiency-, or asset seeking 
(Dunning & Lundan, 2008, p. 68). Historically, enterprises have invested in foreign 
countries first motivated by the availability of natural resources. As this is in place, 
other motivations arise. By understanding how the MNE behaves and what motivates 
it to invest, we can get a better understanding of why the MNEs invest in certain 
countries. This is outlined in chapter 2.1. 
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I will use OECD’s benchmark definition of FDI, which is in line with the work of 
UNCTAD. OECD has developed this strict definition to make the statistics more 
reliable, which is important when you compare the level of FDI, as I will in my 
analyses. “A category of cross-border investment made by a resident entity in one 
economy (the direct investor) with the objective of establishing a lasting interest in an 
enterprise (the direct investment enterprise) that is resident in an economy other than 
that of the direct investor” (OECD, 2009, p. 22). In this definition, it becomes clear 
that the enterprise involves itself in value-adding activities in a country different from 
itself, which explains rather simply the foreign in FDI. The direct element is the 
objective of establishing influence over the direct investment enterprise, while the 
investment is the establishment of a lasting interest in an enterprise. The degree of 
influence and control of the investor in the investee is what makes the FDI different 
from other forms of investment, like the portfolio investment.  
 
There have been many attempts to create a threshold definition for when an enterprise 
goes from an ordinary enterprise to a multinational or transnational enterprise. I define 
it in line with the work of the United Nations Conference of Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD). In their Transnationality Index (TNI), they rank the largest corporations 
in the world by using an index as a measure of foreign assets, sales and employment 
(UNCTAD, 2013). In short, this means that the index measures the relationship 
between domestic and foreign investments made by any enterprise. A high score on 
the TNI means that the enterprise has a large proportion of its investments abroad, 
while a low score on the TNI means that the enterprise has a bigger part of its 
investments at home. UNCTAD presents data on nation-level, but the TNI-index deals 
with enterprises. Considering that I will use data on nation-level and not corporation-
level, I will not use the TNI index in my analysis. However, when looking at some 
countries in a case study, the TNI index is interesting as it can give insights to what 
enterprises are present in a country and how transnational that enterprise is. A large 
MNE present in a small EU member state may have big consequences for the annual 
inflow of FDI in that country.   
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When working with MNEs and FDI, it is important that the numbers are comparable. 
To mend the differences in methodology used in the different member states, the 
OECD has developed a benchmark definition of FDI. The work started in 1983 with 
the first edition of the “Benchmark Definition of Foreign Direct Investment”, which 
tried to establish a set of rules to improve the statistical measures of FDI (OECD, 
2009, p. 14). The benchmark definition is now in its fourth edition, revised because of 
globalization and evolving enterprises. The main objective of the benchmark definition 
is to make a single point of reference in the usage of FDI statistics (OECD, 2009, p. 
15). They apply a numerical criterion, stating that FDI only takes place if the direct 
investor owns at least 10 % of the voting power of the enterprise (OECD, 2009, p. 23). 
This criterion defines when an investor exercises some degree control over another 
enterprise, which is one of the demands for FDI to take place. As Dunning and Lundan 
points out, there is no international consensus for the correct level of voting power 
demanded to have an “effective” degree of influence on the management of an 
enterprise, and you will find variation in this demand from 10 to 25 % in the majority 
of countries (Dunning & Lundan, 2008, p. 7). The enterprise is a subsidiary to the 
direct investor if the investor owns more than 50 % of the voting power in an 
enterprise. If, however, the investor owns more than 10%, but less than 50%, of a 
company, the enterprise is an associate to the direct investor (OECD, 2009, p. 53).  
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1.2. CORPORATE TAXATION AND THE EUROPEAN UNION 
 
Taxation policy is, and has always been, an important area of national control for the 
EU member states, so the regulation of taxes is placed outside of the community 
method and the EU treaties. As with many other areas outside of EU decision-making 
policy, however, there has been attempts on harmonizing and regulating some areas of 
taxation policy, for instance in the Taxation Policy Group or through the work of the 
Tax Package (Cattoir, 2006). A good example of the difficulties regarding tax policy 
in the EU is that the Parent/Subsidiary and Merger Directives of 1990 took no less 
than 30 years of negotiations to adopt (Cattoir, 2006, p. 2). These were the first 
directives concerning business taxation in the European Union. The Tax Package of 
2004 started as a communiqué from the European Commission in 1997, discussed 
heavily in the Council between 1997 and 2004, before adoption. In this package came 
the code of conduct for business taxation. Large differences in taxation policies in the 
EU member states sparked the discussions. There was a need for a more harmonious 
system in the Union, as a continued disharmony would be harmful, both for the 
internal market and the employment (Cattoir, 2006, p. 2). This is related to earlier 
research, where government income losses from reduced corporate tax revenues makes 
governments raise taxes on less mobile (and more predictable) areas like labor taxes, 
which reduces the overall competiveness of the European Union. It seemed as if the 
discussion had to take place in the EU system, as no member state would be willing to 
risk lower tax revenue without knowing that other member states followed in the same 
order. An interesting side note would be that the EU Commissioner initiating the 
discussions on tax policy was Mario Monti, who later became prime minister of Italy 
after the financial crisis.  
 
The Code of Conduct for Business Taxation is to tackle the measures that in a harmful 
way could affect the localization of business in the EU (Cattoir, 2006, p. 3). Even if 
the Code of Conduct did not clearly define the threshold for when a tax becomes 
harmful, it was clear that corporate taxation levels deviating from the other member 
states’ levels was at least potentially harmful. Examples of these in total 66 (!) 
measures are reduced tax rates/bases, group financing, insurances, holding of shares 
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and so on (Cattoir, 2006, p. 6). After adoption, the Code of Conduct group started their 
work of dismantling harmful tax arrangements, and the results started to come already 
by 2003 and 2004 (Cattoir, 2006, p. 6). In addition, in the Eastern Enlargement, the 
Code of Conduct helped the candidate countries roll back many potentially harmful 
measures upon entry. 
 
In addition to the work on harmful taxes, transfer pricing has also been worked on 
from the Commission’s side. Transfer pricing involves the transactions within an 
MNE, and can be truly problematic when working with an internal and fair market as 
the EU single market is supposed to be. “Since the prices are set by non independent 
associates within the multi-national, it may be the prices do not reflect an independent 
market price” (Commission, 2014). This is problematic as the tax bases in the different 
countries are not necessarily the same, as different rules are present in the EU member 
states. This is something that I cannot control for in my thesis, as the issue is too large 
to be included, and it demands a lot of data that is not necessarily publicly available. 
The Commission has worked on this through the Joint Transfer Pricing Forum and the 
Commission working paper Company Taxation in the internal market, but they also 
showed the difficulties to measure and control transfer pricing in a satisfying way 
(European Commission, 2001, p. 7). As such, I will include a section on transfer 
pricing in chapter 5. 
 
The area of corporate taxation is still on the Commission’s agenda, as it has proposed 
amendments to the corporate tax legislation to reduce the risk of tax avoidance 
(European Commission, 2013a). With the increased interest in the business taxation in 
the EU, came also the research on the impact of national taxation regimes on the 
locational decisions of MNEs in the EU. In the following paragraphs, I will give an 
overview of the findings in these analyses, before I look at the theories and variables 
in my own thesis in chapter 2. First, I want to discuss whether we can see a race for 
inward FDI in the EU, basing the next sub chapter to a large degree on the book by 
Lars Oxelheim and Pervez Ghauri, European Union and the Race for Foreign Direct 
Investment.  
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1.3. FDI IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: A RACE? 
 
The tax policy in the European Union has two components; the first is the direct 
taxation, where the member states has full sovereignty and the possibility to change 
their tax policies as they choose; the second is indirect taxation, where the European 
Union has taken measures because indirect taxation affects the free movement of 
goods and services (European Commission, 2013b). However, the Commission works 
with harmonization and common framework to avoid tax evasion, double taxation and 
other forms of distortions of competition. Also, the Amsterdam treaty created rules 
against unfair competition in the competition law, but also in other laws preventing 
market dominance (article 102) and state aid  (article 107), most recently updated 
through the Lisbon treaty (European Union, 2007). 
 
Even though the history of FDI is a long one, it was not until the 1980s that the 
expansions of direct investments abroad truly started, at least in terms of volume. The 
trade liberalization of this decade was a game changer, and the removal of capital 
controls played an important part in this process. More and more countries realized the 
difficulties combining capital control with an optimal resource allocation and 
economic growth, goals seen as important in “the decade of deregulations” (Oxelheim 
& Ghauri, 2004, p. 4). The increasing regionalization and the skills and knowledge in 
the MNEs lead to a positive relationship between the investors and the countries, and 
supranational entities like the EU played an important role as a supervisor. Since then, 
the EU member states have implemented several policies recommended by the 
Commission to raise the competitiveness of the Union. The member states have 
implemented these forms of policies and welcomed FDI in their economy because of 
the positive effects FDI may have, as a spillover of technology, job creation, capital 
flows and an increase in production capacity (Oxelheim & Ghauri, 2004, p. 9). From a 
EU perspective, it was important to raise the competitiveness of the EU markets 
compared to the rest of the world, but at the same time makes sure that the intra-
market competition was fair and unbiased. To manage this demanded a modus 
operandi characterized by caution. 
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Growing unemployment was a challenge in many EU member states in the beginning 
of the 1990s. Attracting FDI was a good way of creating jobs, and the member states 
went far in the attempt of out-competing each other (Oxelheim & Ghauri, 2004, p. 14). 
Over time, and perhaps because of unfair competition, there was an increase in 
regulatory policies at the national level, but the level of FDI activity was still growing. 
Even though the EU is a monetary union with harmonized policies in many areas, 
there are still incentives the member states can use to attract FDI. One of these is the 
corporate tax rate. There are also the possibilities of incentives directed at particular 
enterprises, but that is a too complicated area of research for this thesis (Oxelheim & 
Ghauri, 2004, p. 15). 
 
As the level of FDI in the EU grows, so does the competition between the member 
states to attract the MNEs. Most of the member states have investment promotion 
agencies working actively to attract foreign investments, and the EU tried to remedy 
this competition by adopting the code of conduct in 1997. This was a way of securing 
fair competition between the member states and make sure that potentially harmful tax 
measures would not take place (Oxelheim & Ghauri, 2004, p. 19). It is important to 
point out that only specific tax measures are subject to these rules, and that any 
member state is free to reduce their general taxes, as long as they do not only benefit 
MNEs et cetera. The competition between countries still exists, and the introduction of 
the Euro has made it even more active, as some countries have lost the exchange rate 
advantage they had before the Euro came into place. It is important to remember that 
even though there is competition between the countries, the EU represents a region of 
interest, as the MNEs gain access to the internal market no matter what country they 
establish themselves in.  
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There are also policies from the EU that has promoted FDI, and empirical analyses has 
shown that both the Agenda 2000 (Breuss, Egger, & Pfaffermayr, 2001) and the EU 
social cohesion policy (Basile, Castellani, & Zanfei, 2008) amongst others, have 
played an important role in the direction and development of FDI in the EU member 
states. In particular, the Structural and Cohesion funds have shown to attract foreign 
investments in the member states by providing more favorable conditions for the 
investors (Basile, Castellani, & Zanfei, 2008, p. 337). 
 
The competition between the EU member states can be placed in five different 
elements, defined by Oxelheim and Ghauri (2004, p. 16). These elements add some 
perspective to the reasoning behind FDI. They are important as a historical backdrop, 
and they form a basis for discussion later in the thesis.  
 
The first element relates to advantages in information and agglomeration support. 
These forms of incentives are difficult to measure, but are of high importance, for 
instance how the UK has some advantages related to language in relation to US FDI 
(Oxelheim & Ghauri, 2004, p. 21). Other examples are education, level of bureaucracy 
or strategies directed at specific sectors leading to for instance clusters. The latter 
effect may be so large that the corporate tax rate will not play any significant role for 
the locational decision of the MNE (Oxelheim & Ghauri, 2004, p. 22), and this 
element is related to good governance, central in this thesis. 
 
The second element relates to different forms of subsidies. Oxelheim and Ghauri focus 
on grants, tax concessions, soft loans, equity participation and warranties (Oxelheim & 
Ghauri, 2004, pp. 23-24). Grants dominated in the 1980s and 1990s, but EU 
harmonization has reduced their importance. Tax concessions are of course central in 
this thesis. However, the authors also look at sector-specific tax concessions, a mean 
used in particular by Germany (Oxelheim & Ghauri, 2004, p. 26). Soft loans are loans 
given by the governments with a lower rate than the market can offer, often given in 
the start-up phase for the enterprises. Finally, the equity participation “involves 
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subsidy to the extent that the rate of return demanded by the government falls below 
that demanded by private capital markets” (Oxelheim & Ghauri, 2004, p. 27).  
 
The third element, a looser interpretation of international agreements from the host 
government, is a more controversial issue. Social dumping (lowering the labor-related 
demands) and lowering the environmental demands towards the MNEs are examples 
of this (Oxelheim & Ghauri, 2004, p. 28). Whilst the former only has scarce evidence, 
the enlargements of 2004 and 2007 showed some effects for the latter. However, one 
could question whether this is a consequence of intentional policies, it may be more 
probable that investing corporations choose countries that are less occupied by 
compliance with international agreements, as we have seen with complaints on 
Ryanair and Norwegian in the air transport sector.   
 
Cyclical and geographical factors represent the fourth element of competition 
available for the EU member states. Good infrastructure may be the best example, but 
geographical location can also be of big importance for an enterprise looking for a 
particular market (Oxelheim & Ghauri, 2004, p. 28). The final element relates to 
nationalism and home country-biased customers. This means has not been used a lot in 
the EU, but some elements can be seen in the more nationalistic countries, in particular 
the Eastern European countries before entering the Union (Oxelheim & Ghauri, 2004, 
p. 29). This is a problematic statement, however, as home country-biased customers 
can hardly be regulated. Also, one could question whether cyclical and geographical 
factors can be placed in the same category. Cyclical factors as exogenous shocks, 
economic up- or downturns represent a different form of competition than 
geographical factors as natural resources, common languages or infrastructure.  
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1.4. EARLIER RESEARCH 
 
The importance of the host country’s corporate tax rate is not a new discussion, and 
the results of the research done on the field have not been consistent. While Gropp and 
Kostial (2000) found an effect, Devereux and Griffith (2002) did not find a 
determining effect. There are many challenges connected to the analyses of corporate 
tax rates. It is not an easy process to measure the corporate tax rate in a correct matter, 
and there is a large discussion in the literature on what measures to use. In addition, 
national tax regimes differ from one another. For instance, a country may have a low 
corporate tax rate, but a high dividend tax that may nullify the effect the low corporate 
tax rate may give an investor. A third challenge is that many enterprises may accept 
high corporate tax rates if the taxes are in some way connected to better infrastructure 
or public services. A fourth challenge is that tax competition between countries can be 
too expensive because of agglomeration forces, which one prevents by a large 
difference in tax rates (Basile, Castellani, & Zanfei, 2003, p. 15). Economists, often 
overlooking important political factors like stability, inequality or industrial conflicts, 
are responsible for most of the existing literature on the relationship between corporate 
tax rates and FDI.  
1.4.1. GROPP AND KOSTIAL (2000) 
 
The paper by Reint Gropp and Kristina Kostial analyzed the connection between 
corporate tax rates, FDI, and corporate tax revenues. In short, their analysis found 
significant results indicating that national tax regimes indeed affect FDI inflows, and 
that the FDI flows affect the corporate tax base (Gropp & Kostial, 2000, p. 5). They 
also simulated tax rate harmonization on EU-level, but that is less relevant for the 
scope of this thesis. They argued that non-tax factors contaminated earlier research on 
this field, i.e. that they could not isolate the tax effects (Gropp & Kostial, 2000, p. 8). 
They included the growth forecast indicator of the IMF as an indicator of a country’s 
expected growth; an indicator of expected real exchange rate depreciation (relative to 
that of the US), an openness indicator (share of trade in GDP), and finally, they 
included the total FDI flows into a country as an indicator (Gropp & Kostial, 2000, p. 
16). In their econometric analysis, they found that “[…] the statutory tax rate is 
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estimated to be significantly negatively (positively) related to FDI inflows (outflows” 
(Gropp & Kostial, 2000, p. 17). Moreover, “[…] overall, we find strong evidence in 
favor of the notion that taxes play an important role for the magnitude of FDI in and 
outflows. Taxes appear to be an important aspect when firms consider whether or not 
to invest abroad” (Gropp & Kostial, 2000, p. 19). As we shall see in chapter 3, the 
Feasible Generalized Least Squares analysis with Random Effects, as they used, is not 
necessarily the best linear unbiased estimator (BLUE). Therefore, I will replicate their 
findings using an OLS PCSE-model, which I elaborate in the methodology chapter. 
1.4.2. DE SANTIS, MERCURI AND VICARELLI (2001) 
 
The paper by Roberta De Santis, Maria Cristina Mercuri and Claudio Vicarelli 
analyzes the impact of fiscal variables in the location choices within the EU. In short, 
their analysis found that the total fiscal wedge on labor had a bigger impact than the 
corporate tax rates on FDI inflows in the EU member states (De Santis, Mercuri, & 
Vicarelli, 2001, p. 2). This means that the enterprises consider the taxes in general, 
more than the corporate tax rate in particular. They also find that a country with a high 
corporate tax rate might generate a higher level of FDI by lowering the taxation rate 
quite modestly. The authors point out that the corporate tax rate alone does not take 
into account all the aspects of taxation an enterprise meets, for instance loss 
apportionment, interest detaxation or capital allowance and amortization (De Santis, 
Mercuri, & Vicarelli, 2001, p. 11). They included variables representing 
macroeconomics (per capita GDP, GDP, exchange rate volatility, degree of market 
openness), environmental conditions (infrastructure, technological innovation) and 
fiscal determinants (tax burden, tax wedge on labor and corporate tax rate) (De Santis, 
Mercuri, & Vicarelli, 2001, pp. 18-19). All the variables included in the analysis 
turned out to be significant, but that the tax wedge on labor is of more importance than 
the corporate tax rates (De Santis, Mercuri, & Vicarelli, 2001, p. 25). 
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1.4.3. BÉNASSY-QUÉRÉ, FONTAGNÉ, AND LAHRÈCHE-RÉVIL, (2003) 
 
The authors of this paper tested the sensitiveness of FDI to tax differentials across 
countries. They found that a relatively high level of corporate taxes discourages FDI 
inflows, but that a low level of corporate tax rates does not significantly attract FDI 
(Bénassy-Quéré, Fontagné, & Lahrèche-Révil, 2003). This means that lowering your 
corporate tax rates to match the lowest rates in the EU does not necessarily give you a 
big increase in FDI, but that having the highest tax rates in no way will benefit your 
inflows. By using a panel analysis consisting of bilateral FDI flow data from 1984-
2000, they showed that tax differentials matter. In addition, the research showed that 
the FDI inflow reaction to tax differentials is not linear; instead, it depends on the size 
and sign of the tax gap, in addition to bilateral tax schemes (Bénassy-Quéré, Fontagné, 
& Lahrèche-Révil, 2003, p. 8). They measure this with a statutory tax differential, an 
average effective tax differential, a marginal effective tax differential and an apparent 
effective tax differential, all of which have a significant effect (Bénassy-Quéré, 
Fontagné, & Lahrèche-Révil, 2003, p. 19). There is a discussion in the literature of 
what measure to use when researching tax policy consequences, and this is something 
I will discuss in chapter 3. They also used the gravity variables (size and physical 
distance between two countries), relative unit labor costs, public expenses, market 
potential, and common language. By testing for the impact of tax schemes, they find 
that “the semi-elasticities to tax differentials are significant for both credit and 
exemption countries” (Bénassy-Quéré, Fontagné, & Lahrèche-Révil, 2003, p. 20). 
Large tax discrepancies are more important than narrow tax differentials, in that the 
former produces more FDI outflows (Bénassy-Quéré, Fontagné, & Lahrèche-Révil, 
2003, p. 26). 
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2. THEORIES 
 
Because there are many motivating factors leading to FDI, it is difficult to perceive a 
complete theory of the determinants of FDI. Therefore, I will present John Dunning’s 
Eclectic Paradigm (OLI-paradigm) as a general understanding, before I dive into more 
the location-specific determinants. Even though the entire OLI-paradigm is interesting 
for the analysis of MNE activity, I will especially look at the locational factors, as my 
research question relates to this, before I continue with theory on tax competition and 
institutions/good governance. I will to a large degree base the first part of the chapter 
on the book written by John Dunning and Sarianna Lundan in 2008, Multinational 
Enterprises and the Global Economy. The book draws on Dunning’s earlier work and 
gives a good analysis of the paradigm. It is important to remember that the OLI-
paradigm has been an area of dynamic change over time, so even if it still resembles 
the original article from 1976 and further the article from 1980, “Toward an eclectic 
theory of international production: some empirical tests”, the paradigm has evolved 
since then. I agree with the criticism from Dunning’s apprentice Rajneesh Narula, in 
that the constant development of the eclectic paradigm has made the paradigm 
cumbersome, and that the basic OLI-paradigm, or the “EP-lite”, as Narula calls it, 
gives the best foundation for discussion (Narula, 2010, p. 39).  
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2.1. THE ECLECTIC PARADIGM 
 
John Dunning developed his Eclectic Paradigm as a general framework for the 
analysis of the activities of the MNE. Even though it is not a theory in the pure sense 
of the word, the paradigm offers explanations for the actions MNEs perform on 
foreign soil (Dunning & Lundan, 2008, p. 95). There are many external factors playing 
a part in this as well, for instance the ties between home and host countries, the type of 
products produced, or business strategies (Dunning & Lundan, 2008, p. 103). In short, 
the paradigm postulates ownership-, location-, and internalization specific factors that 
explain why or when a MNE decides to get involved in FDI. The paradigm is meant to 
explain all forms of foreign production through the conditions elaborated for in the 
following paragraphs (Dunning & Lundan, 2008, p. 100). 
 
The level and structure of the MNE’s value-adding activities abroad depends on four 
conditions (Dunning & Lundan, 2008, p. 99). The first condition is whether the MNE 
has some ownership-specific advantages (O) relative to other enterprises in the search 
for new markets. To a large degree, these take the form of intangible assets (Dunning 
& Lundan, 2008, p. 99). Using these O advantages in a good way may lead to a 
wealth-increase for the enterprise. The second condition is the market internalization 
(I). If the first condition is met, the enterprise has to decide whether to add value to the 
O advantages (the alternative is to sell them to others). The I-advantages are usually 
related to a strong organization or an “ability to exercise monopoly power over the 
assets under their governance” (Dunning & Lundan, 2008, p. 100). The third condition 
relates to the location-specific advantages (L).  If the two first two conditions are met, 
the decision to invest hinges upon the degree to which the enterprise believes that 
using the O advantages in the foreign country is in the enterprise’s best interests. Since 
the L advantages are located in a country, they take different shapes in different 
businesses. The final condition is whether, given the three advantages (OLI) of the 
enterprise, the investment is in line with the long-term objectives of the enterprise 
(Dunning & Lundan, 2008, p. 100). 
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Summarizing, the paradigm predicts that the more O advantages an enterprise has 
relative to other enterprises, the more of an incentive the enterprise has to internalize 
(I) these advantages, and finally, the more the enterprise is willing to use these O and I 
advantages in a foreign country (L), the higher the probability to engage in FDI in a 
foreign country.  
 
The O advantages of an enterprise relative to others can be split into three parts, to 
easier understand what general kinds of advantages we are discussing: property rights 
and/or intangible asset advantages (Oa), advantages of common governance (Ot), and 
institutional assets (Oi) (Dunning & Lundan, 2008, p. 101). The resource structure of 
the enterprise determines the Oa. Examples of these are innovations, management, 
experience or other intangible assets. The advantages of common governance (Ot) are 
advantages branches enjoy relative to their competitors in being part of a bigger 
enterprise, for instance access to product markets, economies of scope and scale, etc. 
The institutional assets (Oi) are “the formal and informal institutions that govern the 
value-added processes within the firm and between the firm and its stakeholders” 
(Dunning & Lundan, 2008, p. 101). This can be different forms of norms, codes of 
conduct, incentive systems, etc. Examples of L advantages can be labor force, access 
to raw materials, infrastructure, import controls or other factors that differ between 
countries. These may also be of legal character (Dunning & Lundan, 2008, p. 102). 
The L advantages are truly interesting for this thesis, as the institutions and good 
governance is a part of this. The I-advantages are among others to avoid negotiation 
costs or broken contracts, to control supplies or market outlets, or to engage in cross-
subsidization or transfer pricing (Dunning & Lundan, 2008, p. 102).  
 
Location-specific advantages 
Dunning makes additional divisions of the L advantages, depending on whether the 
enterprise is resource-, market-, efficiency-, or asset seeking, and each form of 
international production has its own characteristics. There is also a significant 
difference in L advantages between countries and those between industries or firms 
(Dunning & Lundan, 2008, pp. 104-107). Whereas the L advantages for the resource-
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seeker might be possession of natural resources, infrastructure or taxes, the market-
seeker is more interested in labor costs, market size or government policies as tolls or 
other barriers of trade. The efficiency-seeker prioritizes economies of product 
specialization or low labor costs, whilst the asset-seeker might consider locations that 
give technological or organizational improvements for the enterprise (Dunning & 
Lundan, 2008, p. 105). Globalization has made the concept of location more difficult, 
as enterprises can affect countries through their activities, even outside the countries 
they invest in, and the products sold are not necessarily physical products, as was 
common a few decades ago (Cantwell & Narula, 2001, p. 19). 
 
There are important differences in priorities between countries, industries and firms. 
For country-specific circumstances, the physical and institutional distance between the 
home and host country is of importance. The tariffs, taxes, investment aid and other 
macroeconomic factors are also relevant, in addition to the availability of clusters 
(Dunning & Lundan, 2008, p. 106). In industry-specific circumstances, the transport 
costs are more relevant, in addition to industry-specific barriers, the competition 
between the already existing enterprises in the industry, or tax incentives. For the firm-
specific circumstances, management strategies, experience in foreign involvement, 
culture, attitudes to risk diversification and other factors are more relevant (Dunning & 
Lundan, 2008, p. 106). The country-specific circumstances are most relevant for this, 
as my preliminary analysis will examine how the country’s tax regime affects onward 
flow of FDI to the country. Also, there is dynamism between some ownership-specific 
and locational advantages, and the interaction between them is increasing (Cantwell & 
Narula, 2001, p. 7). In particular, technological advances in certain enterprises are 
often specific to regions or nations, and it is therefore important for other enterprises to 
be on site in order to follow such technological advances, leading to clusters of similar 
enterprises in the same areas.  
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The value of institutions has been of more interests to the scholars of FDI in recent 
years. You could argue that the quality of institutions is playing a bigger and more 
important role than ever, especially considering how O advantages today are more 
easily transferable between countries than before (Dunning & Lundan, 2008, p. 138). 
The OLI paradigm did not incorporate the growing literature of institutions in its 
original version, but in the second edition of Dunning and Lundan’s book, a section 
was included on how institutional quality affected the ability to attract FDI, and also 
how they can affect how the MNEs think when deciding to invest (Dunning & 
Lundan, 2008, pp. 308-309). Whether this is relevant to the EU is something this 
thesis will look more into in chapter 2.3, but it is interesting to see that authors like 
Rodrik et al. (2002) conclude that the quality of institutions is more important than 
economic integration and geography, even though they have an indirect effect through 
the quality of institutions (Rodrik, Subramanian, & Trebbi, 2004). I would expect that 
the institutional changes in the Central and Eastern European countries following the 
end of the Cold War and process leading up to the eastern enlargements of 2004 and 
2007 (and also Croatia in 2013), played a significant part in the increasing 
attractiveness of investing in these countries.  
 
TABLE 1 LOCATIONAL DETERMINANTS (DUNNING J., 1980) 
Type of international production Location advantages 
Resource-based Possession of resources 
Import substituting manufacturing Material and labor costs, markets, 
government policy 
Export platform manufacturing Low labor costs, incentives by host 
economies 
Trade and distribution Local markets, proximity to the local 
costumers, local adaptation 
Ancillary services Markets 
Miscellaneous Markets 
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2.2. TAX COMPETITION 
 
Most theories of tax competition claim that a state’s primary economic goal is to offer 
public services. Taxes finance these public services, and to raise profits, the countries 
attract investment to maximize the net value added in a country (Wilson, 1999, p. 
271).  However, to attract inward investments, the corporate tax rates must be kept at 
as low as possible a level, given the level of public goods. This is where the 
competitive element arrives (Wilson, 1999, p. 272). There have been many models 
built upon this theoretical framework, and we can start with a baseline model. The 
basic assumption of the theory of tax competition is that countries delve into a 
wasteful competition in the attempt to attract investments through tax reductions 
(Genschel & Schwarz, 2011, p. 339), and that the countries enter a “race to the 
bottom”.  
 
Within each of the 28 member states in the EU3, there are enterprises producing some 
form of output. For the simplicity of the model, you can say that each enterprise 
produces a single output, based on two production factors: mobile capital and 
immobile labor (Wilson, 1999, p. 273). Consumers buy the products as consumption 
goods, while the government buys the products as an “[…] intermediate good, which it 
then transforms into a public good”. (Wilson, 1999, p. 273). We can explain this using 
a utility function, U (C, G) where C represents private consumption and G is the 
consumption of public goods. The consumer with wage and other income finances C. 
Importantly, the model assumes that taxes on capital finance the supply of public 
goods in the country (Wilson, 1999, p. 273).4 Corporate taxes are rarely a large portion 
of a state’s income, however, so the assumption may be exaggerated (see table 17 in 
appendix). A challenge for the countries is to find the optimal tax rates, those that 
maximize the utility function, U, mentioned above. In this theoretical framework with 
competition between two countries, Wilson emphasizes how raising taxes in country a 
leads to an increase in revenue in country b because of the outflow in country a. This 
happens because countries are only concerned with maximizing the welfare of their 
                                            
3 Wilson use “regions” instead of countries, as the model may be used for cities, states, provinces or countries 
(Wilson, 1999, 2003). For any purpose of this thesis, I will use the term country. 
4 So does taxes on personal income as well, something Wilson does not look at.  
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citizens (Wilson, 1999, p. 275). In the race to attract foreign investments and capital, 
countries set their tax rates at a suboptimal low level. We might expect a different 
result in the EU, as this theoretical perspective assumes the same tax rate in every 
country (region), although it might explain why the European Commission is working 
with this subject on a EU level. 
 
Taxation of cross-border flows usually follows one of two approaches: the 
source/origin principle or the residence/destination principle (Genschel & Schwarz, 
2011, p. 343). Following the source/origin principle, the country taxing is the country 
where the investment takes place. However, following the residence/destination 
principle, the country taxing is the home of the investor. In corporate taxation, 
countries often tax the profits from both domestic and foreign activity, and as you 
would expect, the source/origin principle is the general principle followed (Genschel 
& Schwarz, 2011, p. 346). As MNEs will strive to maximize profits, they may 
arbitrage in two ways – either by shifting the book profits to a low-tax country 
(transfer pricing), or by moving the activities generating profit there (Genschel & 
Schwarz, 2011, p. 346). The former is more interesting for this thesis, as it involves 
transfer pricing, which is a subject I will return more to in the conclusions of the 
paper. The latter includes the possibility that business is transferred to tax havens; this 
is not dealt with here in my thesis.  
 
The theory on tax competition predicts a race to the bottom and a suboptimal tax rate 
in the international competition between countries. This could be an argument for 
better harmonization on corporate tax rates in the EU. But, as Bénassy-Quéré et al 
claim: “(…) the fear of tax competition is justified only if (i) mobile bases do respond 
to tax cuts through relocation, (ii) tax cuts produce a loss in fiscal receipts at least in 
some countries, and (iii) this revenue loss needs to be compensated for by a welfare-
decreasing tax increase on other, less mobile bases, likely (non-qualified) labor.” 
(Bénassy-Quéré, Fontagné, & Lahrèche-Révil, 2003).  
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2.3. DO INSTITUTIONS MATTER? 
 
The discussions on the importance of political institutions and good governance for 
economic growth have escalated the last decades. There is a consensus that the quality 
of government, and good governance, is essential for austerity in a country, however 
inconclusive the definition of government quality may be. In general, governance 
involves political institutions, state capacity and the regulation of economic 
institutions (Acemoglu, 2008). An example of this is how different the economic 
development has been in the countries of South Korea and North Korea. People of 
similar origin, highly contrasting political systems, and seeing how the democratic 
state of South Korea, by far, outperforming the communist North Korea. The literature 
emphasizes the broad definition of institutions, but struggle to find what aspects of 
institutions are most important (Acemoglu, 2008, p. 2). Most scholars emphasize a 
non-intervening state (low taxes, high property rights), but there are several cases 
where an intervening state may experience economic growth over time (the Nordic 
countries in particular). However, there is a causal relationship between institutions 
and prosperity and growth, in how poor countries, when strengthening their property 
rights, raise their productiveness (Rodrik, 2004, p. 1). I choose to define good 
governance in economic terms, so that good governance and good political institutions 
facilitate economic growth and foreign investments in the country, in line with Fatica 
(2010), La Porta et al. (1999), and Daude and Stein (2007). This means that a 
government that is perceived as good by the inhabitants, but that does not facilitate 
economic growth and foreign investment, will not be regarded as good in my 
definition, but this is a common definition in the literature.  
 
The empirical literature on the quality of political institutions and how this affects 
inflows of FDI has also grown, but is still rather scarce – at least amongst the tax 
economists. However, the topic of whether higher or lower taxes are best for economic 
growth (intervention versus non-intervention) has been discussed for a long time, and 
the results are ambiguous (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1999, p. 
225). In some cases, low taxes promote trade, but in other cases, high taxes are spent 
on important goods, which makes investment more interesting. Because of the 
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pressure put on governments to reduce corruption and to correct distorted incentives in 
the market, the public services are often overlooked (Acemoglu, 2008, p. 6). Many 
scholars have been interested in how political institutions affect government 
corruption, both in terms of size and pattern (see Mauro 1995; Burki and Perry 1998; 
Kaufman et. al 1999; Bai and Wei 2000). In addition to the direct effects political 
institutions may have on investments, quality of government and good governance can 
also affect economic growth and investments indirectly through protecting the 
property rights (Knack & Keefer, 1985).  
 
My theoretical point of departure is that the quality of political institutions can affect 
the countries’ level of FDI through the public expenditure of tax revenues, especially 
in OECD-countries. This theoretical argument is based on the consensually strong 
state (Acemoglu, 2005), where society exercises notable control over the government, 
yet taxes are still high. This argument goes against much of the literature on political 
institutions; especially where the large state with high taxes discourages economic 
growth (North, 1981). Even though it is clear that extreme taxation discourages 
investments, weak states often fail to make investments that are important for 
enterprises, such as infrastructure and legal services (Acemoglu, 2005, p. 1202). Thus, 
investors can accept high taxes, assuming revenues are spent in a way that makes 
investments easier, and safer. If we consider the European Attractiveness Survey for 
2013, reducing the tax rates are not even in the top five priorities of the European 
enterprises. However, more economic and political integration is seen as vital, a point 
supporting the theory on the importance of institutions when investing in the EU 
(Ernst & Young, 2013, p. 40). Based on the theoretical arguments laid out by 
Acemoglu, I expect that political institutions matter for EU member states, and that the 
arguments of Acemoglu are relevant for these countries.  
 
In the next paragraphs, I will elaborate my research question and the independent 
variables chosen to test the research question. I will also discuss the methods I can use 
and what methods I should use, before embarking on the econometric analysis.  
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3. METHOD AND DESIGN 
 
When deciding on method and design, the structure of the data has several important 
implications. I have decided to perform a quantitative analysis, and the data used in the 
thesis supports this. By doing a quantitative analysis, I will be able to measure the 
uncertainty and errors in the research; this would be impossible through a qualitative 
analysis. Where the qualitative methods are more case-oriented, the quantitative 
methods are variable-oriented (Iversen, 2004, p. 896). The goal for the quantitative 
methods will always be to generalize findings from a sample to a universe, an issue I 
will return to later. Earlier research in this field has also shown that the quantitative 
methods and forms of analysis have given a good view of how certain variables affect 
the inflow of FDI to countries. However, scholars of qualitative methods have 
criticized the use of quantitative methods. Alan Bryman points out four reasons in 
particular (Bryman, 2004, p. 78): First that the quantitative researchers do not seem to 
separate the social institutions from the natural world. Second, the accuracy of the 
measurements is criticized, in particular that researchers depend too rigorously in 
correlation and p-values (Bryman, 2004, p. 78). Third, qualitative researchers criticize 
the quantitative scholars by pointing out the stringency and control, and the last 
critique relates to the static relationship between the variables, far away from the 
dynamics of human nature (ibid). While it is true that some quantitative scholars 
excessively rely on the P-value and correlational relationship between variables, it is 
also true that qualitative research struggles to measure the relationship between the 
same variables. As I will show, the variables used in this analysis are based on 
theoretical expectations of relationships between them and the dependent variable. 
Also, I will do robustness tests to support the validity of the findings. 
 
There are many forms of quantitative analyses to use when studying the effects 
national tax regimes have on foreign direct investments, but as I am most interested in 
studying this over a given time period, either time-series data or cross-sectional time-
series data (panel data) are the most relevant alternatives. With panel data, I can 
observe n different units over t different time periods, in this case 21 units over 15 
years, which would give the analysis 21*15= 315 observations (Stock & Watson, 
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2007, p. 350)5. By looking at changes in the dependent variable over time, I can 
eliminate the effect of possible omitted variables that vary across countries, but are 
stable over time (Stock & Watson, 2007, p. 349). This makes my analysis more robust 
than other forms of quantitative analyses. I will return to this later, but first I will 
explain the sample of the analysis.  
3.1. SAMPLE – EU MEMBER STATES 
 
The universe of the thesis is narrowed down to the EU member states – as defined in 
the research question. However, because of data availability, or rather the lack thereof, 
I have not been able to use all of the states. Since I am using OECD statistics for the 
FDI-data, EU member states in the OECD are my original sample. Even though the 
OECD statistics databases are thorough and the time span for the data is long, not all 
the EU member states in the OECD have good enough data availability for this 
analysis. Thus, Malta, Croatia, Romania, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Latvia and Lithuania have 
been left out of the analysis, and I therefore have 21 units in my sample (measured 
over 15 years). This could be a serious challenge to the analysis, as Malta and Cyprus 
has been regarded as tax havens in a European context, and I will revisit this in the 
concluding remarks. 
 
The universe in this thesis is defined as all EU member states. Because of this, the 
feature of random selection loses some of its meaning. If I were to draw a random 
selection of EU member states that are also in the OECD database, I would draw the 
same units every time. This is a challenge to the analysis, as I will not be able to use 
the P-values as I wish. The problem is larger in analyses where the units are the OECD 
countries and the universe in the analysis is all of the countries in the world, in my 
case the universe are almost the same countries as the units (and therefore, my 
selection is nearly complete). An alternative presented, amongst others by Bruce 
Western, is to use a Bayesian approach where you average the results across many 
models, using weights to control for the effects (Western, 1996, p. 166). However, I 
lack suitable capacity and space required to go through with a Bayesian approach. I 
                                            
5 These observations are not 315 independent observations, however, as each country-year is affected by the 
prior country-year. 
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will try to mend this with robustness tests as others have done before me (see 
Rasmussen, 2012). Also, I am close to the actual universe, and therefore will not have 
a goal of generalizing the findings to a bigger population (Scruggs, 2007, pp. 309-
310). 
3.2. DEPENDENT VARIABLE – FDI AS AN INDICATOR OF MNE ACTIVITY  
 
Figure 3 Annual inward FDI flows in current US Dollars, millions. Source: OECD statistics 
 
The research question of this thesis relates to how national tax regimes and institutions 
affect MNE activity in EU member states. I have chosen to use annual stock level FDI 
relative to GDP as an indicator of that phenomenon, which may need an elaboration: 
by using annual intervals in a panel data analysis, I can see changes over time in the 
country-specific variables.  
 
There are several ways of measuring MNE activity, such as sales numbers, 
employment numbers and the level of FDI. The estimated output or input stock level 
of FDI has often been used in the empirical literature, though without explaining why 
this measure is a better proxy than for example sales or employment numbers. Many 
scholars of MNE’s use sales data as a measure of their activity, such as the value of 
goods and services sold or investment income for financial enterprises (Wacker, 2013, 
p. 8). There are several issues complicating this measure. Mainly that sales data will 
not give a correct estimate of an MNE’s degree of influence in the country it invests 
in; at least to a lesser degree than FDI (Wacker, 2013, p. 31).  Employment data may 
also be used as a measure of MNE activity, by using the number of employees on the 
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payroll of the enterprise at the end of the year. The biggest advantage with this 
measure is that it is a true variable, in that it is not expressed through a monetary 
measure (Wacker, 2013, p. 8). However, as this measure does not account for the 
differences in productivity, but on the contrary give every employee the same value, 
you might not get a sufficient grip of the economic value of each employee (Wacker, 
2013, p. 8). Also, this measure will not necessarily give an adequate description of the 
influence the MNE has on the host country, and the availability of data is not always 
good; the employment data is often missing (Wacker, 2013, p. 9).  
 
Using FDI data is, however, not without challenges. Challenges using this 
measurement are, amongst other, related to differences in national accounting systems. 
The OECD recommends that reinvested earnings and inter-company debt are included 
in the definition of direct investment, in addition to the more obvious equity 
investment (OECD, 2009, p. 49). This is included in the FDI-data in my dataset. Also, 
the capital structure of the MNE creates some problems, as FDI only covers some 
parts of the assets, and therefore undervalues the assets controlled by the MNE. We 
could include the total assets of the MNE, but this is not common in literature, mainly 
because it requires data that is not easily available, but also because the gains are only 
moderate (Wacker, 2013, p. 7). 
Table 2 Bivariate correlations between annual FDI stocks and flows6 
  FDI flows FDI stocks 
FDI flows 1.0000 
 FDI stocks 0.6330 1.0000 
 
FDI can either be measured as flows or stocks. Flow data shows the total transactions 
being made in a certain amount of time t (in this thesis; 1 year), whilst stock data 
accumulates the flow data. If a country has an inflow of FDI of $1,000,000 in year 1, 
and another $1,000,000 in year 2, the stock value in year 1 would be $1,000,000, and 
$2,000,000 in year 2, while the flow data would be $1,000,000 for both years. A 
challenge using stock data is the valuation of past investments. What an investment of 
one million US Dollars made in year 1 is worth in year 10 is not an easy task to 
                                            
6 I will, where necessary, use up to 3 decimal places in my tables in this thesis.  
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measure correctly. This is a challenge in the statistics I use, as the stock level FDI is 
measured in current US Dollars and not with an index or using constant US Dollars (, 
or another currency). UNCTAD and other statistics databases have different measures, 
but I give priority to balancing the dataset, and the OECD database is the most 
complete. Even if stock data is preferable, as it includes all the assets in FDI data, the 
correlation between stock and flow data is so high that flow data is in most cases 
sufficient, although the flows fluctuate a lot from one year to the next. Because inflow 
data fluctuates a lot from year to year, I will perform the analysis using stock data, as 
most scholars as well have done. Preliminary analyses showed that using the measure 
of FDI flows per GDP (fdigdp1) as my dependent variable did not provide robust 
results, but the FDI stock level data per GDP (fdistockgdp) variable did. This is an 
annual measure in US Dollars, following the OECD benchmark definition of FDI, and 
should provide robust and reliant results (OECD, 2013a).  
Figure 4 Annual inward FDI stock data in millions of US Dollars, scatter. Source: OECD Statistics 
 
The reliability of parts of the data should be questioned, however, as many of the 
reporting countries have failed to use the 10 percent threshold in a satisfying manner, 
especially before year 2000 (International Monetary Fund, 2003, p. 23). Some 
countries use the percentage threshold as a criterion, but include ownership of less 
than ten percent, but where the investor still has an effective voice. There is nothing I 
can do to avoid this issue, and it is a possible error source in the analysis. However, 
this should be of minor importance in the big picture. It is also important to remember 
that a subsidiary may start up in a country by lending money domestically, and not 
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from loans or equity from the parent country. In those instances, the FDI flow will be 
unaffected, even if a parent foreign enterprise invests in another country (Devereux & 
Griffith, 2002, 84). This would rather be a part of the Foreign Portfolio Investment 
(FPI).  
Table 3 Descriptive statistics tax 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
FDI flows per GDP 311 5.693 9.794 -55.074 74.697 
FDI stocks 311 243037.9 295457.7 1733.674 1341827 
FDI stocks per GDP 311 53.722 48.879 8.887 318.178 
 
As we can see from the descriptive statistics, the level of FDI as a percentage of GDP 
can fluctuate significantly year-to-year. The extreme levels come from Luxembourg, 
who in 2007 experienced serious challenges from the financial crisis. If we remove 
Luxembourg from the analysis, the descriptive statistics show less of a fluctuation in 
the minimum and maximum values, and a smaller standard deviation. In this sense, 
Luxembourg is an outlier in the analysis. However, I will include the country, as it is 
important to include as many units as possible to raise the robustness of the model. 
Using panel data analysis, it is problematic to drop more units than necessary, as 
dropping them will reduce the explained variance and reduce the reliability of the 
analysis. Even though Luxembourg is an outlier, it is still a part of the subject I am 
interested in, as a EU member state with relatively high levels of FDI in the economy.  
Figure 5 Annual inward FDI flows per GDP in Luxembourg 
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3.3. INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
 
In section 1.5.1 I explained the variables used in Gropp and Kostial’s analysis. I do not 
possess the same data material as they did, but I will replicate their study with the data 
available to me from the time period of 1998-2012.  First, I will include a measure on 
exchange rates, where I measure the national currency per US dollars at the end of 
each year, from the OECD statistics database (OECD, 2014). Gropp and Kostial used 
an indexed measure, but this exchange rate measure should be suitable for showing the 
differences between the economic situations in the EU member states relative to USA. 
Second, I include a measure on the expected growth forecast, also from the OECD 
statistics database (OECD, 2014). Third, I include a measure of the total share of trade 
in goods and services, measured in percentage of GDP from the World Development 
Indicators statistics database (World Bank, 2012). Fourth, I include annual inflation as 
a measure, from the OECD statistics database (OECD, 2014). As in the analysis by 
Gropp and Kostial, I will lag the inflation measure by one year. I will also include the 
total FDI flows relative to GDP. 
 
Table 4 Descriptive statistics of Gropp and Kostial's variables 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Expected growth 315 2.302 3.272 -14.098 10.971 
Inflation (lagged) 314 3.001 2.543 -4.5 18.3 
Exchange rate 315 13.218 47.294 .499 286.49 
Trade (share of GDP) 312 109.328 56.898 46.641 333.532 
Total FDI (in and out per GDP) 307 .098 .158 -.156 1.326 
 
As we can see from the descriptive statistics, there are big fluctuations in both the 
exchange rate variable and the share of trade variable. Especially Hungary (exchange 
rate) and Estonia (trade) deviate from the rest of the countries. Hungary had, in the 
beginning of the 2000s, a high level of national units per US Dollar, relative to the 
other countries involved in the analysis. This is shown in figure 6.  Figure 7 shows 
how the share of trade variable fluctuates from year to year in Estonia. The measure, 
merchandise trade as a share of GDP, is the sum of exports and imports in 
merchandise, divided by the value of GDP (current US dollars). The merchandise 
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sector in Estonia suffered in the aftermath of the financial crisis, but quickly regained 
it’s status when it joined the Euro cooperation and the Euro group in 2011 (European 
Commission, 2012).  
 
Figure 6 Exchange rate fluctuations, Hungary. Source: OECD statistics 
 
 
Figure 7 Share of trade, Estonia. Source: OECD statistics 
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3.3.1. TAX VARIABLES 
 
While it is clear that the thesis will test how national tax regimes affect the inflow of 
FDI in that country, it is less clear how to measure the tax rates. Prima facie, one 
would use the statutory capital tax rate, as they represent the rate the governments set. 
However, there are many forms of exception policies and other forms of incentives for 
investing enterprises in the EU member states. Also, the size of the tax base matters 
for the statutory rate. A large tax base might compensate for a low statutory tax rate 
(Bénassy-Quéré, Fontagné, & Lahrèche-Révil, 2003, p. 11).  
 
The Dévereux/Griffith methodology tries to solve this problem by adding the average 
effective tax rate into the research, in addition to the marginal effective tax rates, and 
the apparent effective tax rates (see Bénassy-Quéré, Fontagné, & Lahrèche-Révil, 
2003 for empirical research). The correct method of measurement depends on what 
you are trying to measure. The average tax rate is a good measure to use if you assume 
that the investor wants the highest post-tax return possible. However, the amount of 
investment will be determined by the point where the expected pre-tax rate of return 
equals the cost of capital, and in this case, the marginal tax rate would be preferable. 
As the corporate tax regimes generally are non-linear, the marginal tax rate and the 
average tax rate may differ in a significant way (Devereux & Griffith, 2002, 89). We 
could also use the effective tax rates, which are forward-looking, and often used for 
specific investments (calculating, for instance, the investment of production facilities 
for a car manufacturer).  
The methodology developed by Dévereux and Griffith expects that it is the statutory or 
the average effective tax rates that affect the locational decision of the MNEs, whereas 
other tax measures influence the decisions on whether or not to reinvest in the host 
country (Bénassy-Quéré, Fontagné, & Lahrèche-Révil, 2003, p. 11). When Devereux 
and Griffith researched where MNEs want to produce (locational decision), they found 
that the effective average tax rates were significant in the analysis, but not the 
marginal tax rates (Devereux & Griffith , 1998). 
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Figure 8 Effective Average Tax Rates in EU member states - development (scatter) 
 
 
I will therefore use the Devereux/Griffith methodology with tax rates developed by 
Christoph Spengel, Christina Elschner and Dieter Endres through the project 
”Effective tax rates in an enlarged European Union”, at the Centre for Economic 
Research. The tax rates are available from 1998-20127 (Spengel, Elschner, & Endres, 
2012). By using the effective average tax rate (EATR) I measure the tax rates in a way 
that accounts for the national differences in exceptions and subtractions, and measures 
effective tax rates on domestic investment. They take into account company-level 
taxation, but not personal shareholder taxation, and no cross-border taxation. 
 
The existing literature and research forms the basis for my hypotheses for this 
variable: 
 
H1: There is a significant and negative relationship between high corporate tax rate in 
the host country and the level of FDI. 
 
H2: The relationship between corporate tax rates in the host country and the level of 
FDI weakens, as political variables are included in the analysis.  
 
 
                                            
7 See table 16 in the appendix for development of the statutory tax rates in the EU. 
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The literature presented so far seems to confirm that the corporate tax rate matters in 
the locational decision for a MNE. However, Tiebout pointed to the fact that not only 
taxes matter, but that the provision of public goods plays an important role as well 
(Bénassy-Quéré, Fontagné, & Lahrèche-Révil, 2003, p. 9). This means that if there are 
high levels of public goods in a country, a taxpayer might accept high rates of 
corporate tax, because of personal preferences. This means that the clear-cut 
connection between tax rates and FDI inflows might be exaggerated. This will be 
elaborated after the quantitative analysis.  
 
Table 5 Descriptive statistics for EATR 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Effective Average Tax 
Rates 315 25.622 6.523 9.361 41.191 
Statutory Tax Rates 315 28.393 7.080 12.5 56.046 
 
There are considerable fluctuations in the tax variable, and this gives the analysis a 
good starting point. We find the lowest Effective Average Tax Rates in Bulgaria from 
2007-2012, whereas Germany holds the highest effective average tax rates. If we 
exclude the two countries, the mean changes to 24.03 and the standard deviation does 
not change significantly: 6.8. We can also see that if we correlate the EATR measure 
with the statutory tax variables from the OECD statistics database, the correlation is 
present, but there clearly is a difference, especially in Belgium and Greece. It also 
becomes apparent that there is a difference between the statutory tax rates and the 
EATR, even if the correlation is high between them. 
 
Table 6 Bivariate correlations between statutory tax rates and effective average tax rates 
Variable Statutory EATR 
Statutory 1.0000 
 EATR 0.8980 1.0000 
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3.3.2. INFRASTRUCTURE 
 
I include infrastructure in the analysis, as Bellak et al did in their analysis of 
determinants of FDI in Central and Eastern European countries (Bellak & Leibrecht, 
2008). The theoretical argument is that an increase in public expenditure on 
infrastructure reduces the transportation costs for the MNE investing in the country, 
thereby increasing the attractiveness of the country. This is a variable few of the 
empirical analyses on the field have included, but I have chosen to do so because I 
believe that infrastructure is important for investors in the EU, especially considering 
the closeness to other countries and markets in the EU. Also, a higher public spending 
on infrastructure works as a complimentary good to the tax rates, and might in that 
sense reduce the effect of a low corporate tax rates. Infrastructure represents the output 
of government performance, and can as such work as a proxy for good governance. 
 
The measure is taken from the EUROSTAT statistics database, and measures the total 
amount of motorway in the country at the end of each year, measured in kilometers per 
square kilometer, so that the size of the country is controlled for8 (Eurostat, 2013). I 
could have measured infrastructure by using public expenditure on infrastructure 
budgets, but that would have measured the phenomenon on the input rather than the 
output. A transport company would be more interested in how many roads that are 
being built, more than how much money they cost. Therefore, I use the amount of 
kilometers as my measure on infrastructure. In addition, the data on public expenditure 
on infrastructure endowments are not complete, and would reduce the number of 
variables in the panel data analysis.  
 
On the basis of the last paragraphs, I expect the following relationship between public 
spending on infrastructure and the inflow of FDI in the host country:  
 
H3: There is a significant and positive relationship between infrastructure in the host 
country and the level of FDI 
 
                                            
8 Kilometers of motorway, divided by the square kilometers of land area in the country. Area statistics are 
gathered from the EU. http://europa.eu/about-eu/facts-figures/living/index_en.htm 
! !  42 
I also include the conditional hypothesis from Bellak et al on the relationship between 
tax rates and infrastructure (2009, 268): 
 
H4: The importance of lower tax rates decreases with an increase in a country’s 
infrastructure endowment.   
 
Table 7 Descriptive statistics for infrastructure - motorway 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Motorway per sq. km. 257 20.956 19.511 0.857 78.017 
 
The measure does not take into account the differences in country size, and this 
explains the large differences in minimum and maximum values. Obviously, there are 
no EU member states without motorways, so the minimum values are in fact missing 
values. France and Spain dominate the growth in kilometers of motorways, as we can 
see in figures 9 and 10.  
 
Figure 9 Kilometers of motorway, Spain 
 
Figure 10 Kilometers of motorway, France 
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3.3.3. THE INSTITUTIONAL VARIABLES 
 
I claim that institutions matter, in line with the research of Acemoglu (2005), where 
certain countries can have high tax rates and a high level of investments, as the 
revenues from the taxes are spent on complimentary goods important for the investor 
and the population. The empirical effect of political institutions, although difficult to 
measure, has been shown by many scholars to be significant (see Blonigen, 2005). 
Also, an investor is less willing to invest in a country with low political stability, many 
strikes, conflicts in the labor market and other challenges that can affect productivity 
and profitability for the investment.  
 
However, when considering which variables to include in the analysis, the picture is 
not so clear. Most of the measures use indexes including data on political, economical 
or legal institutions, often stemming from survey data (Blonigen, 2005, p. 390). Fatica 
(2010) included biannual survey data on rule of law and government effectiveness, 
while Daude and Stein (2007) especially saw that governmental instability, excessive 
regulation, and the unpredictability of laws played an important role in deterring FDI.  
By using institutional variables originally developed by Kaufmann et al. (1999), their 
results showed that regulatory quality and governmental effectiveness seem to be the 
most relevant institutional variables (Daude & Stein, 2007, p. 327). 
 
I will include institutional variables developed by Kaufmann et al. (1999), gathered by 
the World Bank in their Worldwide Governance Indicators (World Bank, 2013). The 
data set includes data on control of corruption (corruption), government effectiveness 
(goveffect), political stability and the absence of terrorism (polstab), rule of law 
(ruleoflaw), regulatory quality (regqua), and voice and accountability (voice). The 
first indicator, control of corruption, is a measure on the extent to which public power 
is exercised for private gain. The second, government effectiveness, measures the 
perception of the quality of the civil services, quality of policy implementation and 
credibility of the government. Political stability and the absence of terrorism and 
violence measures the perceptions of likelihood that the government will be 
destabilized or overthrown, while the rule of law measure captures the confidence in 
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quality of contract, property rights, and the police and legal system. The indicator of 
regulatory quality captures the perceptions on the government’s ability to implement 
sound policies and regulations. Voice and accountability is the last indicator, and this 
captures perceptions on freedom of expression, the ability to participate in elections 
and so forth. All the indicators are measured as percentile ranks, i.e., ranging from 0 to 
100.  
 
These variables have been used by many scholars in different analyses, and are in 
general judged to be relevant when measuring the quality of institutions (Kaufmann & 
Kraay, 2002, p. 7). However, the measures have shown to be highly correlated with 
each other. This raises the issue of multicollinearity, which I will pay special attention 
to in the analyses.  
 
Figure 11 Bivariate correlations FDI, EATR, and institutional variables 
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As we can see from figure 11, there is substantial multicollinearity between corruption 
and goveffect, ruleoflaw and voice. There are also other worrying correlations between 
some of the other institutional variables. Therefore, I will only include corruption in 
the analyses in the next chapter.9 This variable is also the most interesting 
substantially, as it is the most concrete and direct measure on good governance and 
institutional quality in the dataset.  
 
However, it is not only the quality of the institutions that are important when 
investing; the quality of industry is as well important. To measure the industrial 
quality in a country, I use employment data and data on union density, gathered from 
OECD statistics (OECD, 2013c). Union density data is based on the proportion of the 
full labor force with a union membership, while the employment data is measured as 
the total labor force as a percentage of the population in the country. I expect that 
countries with higher unionization and lower unemployment have a higher proportion 
of inward FDI than other countries. Of course, it may also be that higher 
unemployment and lower unionization gives leverage to the investors, making the 
labor costs lower than in other countries. In that case, we will see a different outcome 
in the analyses. Some has used data on union fractionizing, but I have chosen to use 
data on union density, as it covers the stability of unions in a better way than 
fractionizing can.   
 
Thus, I include also the following hypotheses related to the variables included:  
 
H5: There is a significant and positive relationship between good governance and the 
level of FDI.  
 
H6: There is a significant and positive relationship between the union density in the 
host country and the level of FDI. 
 
H7: There is a significant and positive relationship between employment and the level 
of FDI. 
 
 
                                            
9 I have run many regressions using different measures, and the results do not change in a substantial way when 
leaving out these variables.  
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Table 8 Descriptive statistics for political and industrial stability 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Corruption 273 84.238 12.733 51.196 100 
Political stability 273 76.982 15.661 30.143 100 
Regulatory quality 273 87.751 8.528 66.667 100 
Rule of law 273 85.527 11.929 57.894 100 
Union density 276 32.957 19.857 7.050 81.285 
Employment 251 49.391 5.855 39.067 74.294 
 
The variable corruption shows that there are no countries below a level of 51,2%. The 
variable measures the degree to which power is exercised for private gain (small and 
big forms of corruption) (World Bank). Most EU member states have a high level on 
this measure, but certain countries such as Bulgaria, Greece, and Slovakia are in the 
lower ranks of the Union. For the variable polstab, we can see that the scores fluctuate 
to a larger degree than corruption (see standard deviation). This variable measures the 
perception of the possibility for a destabilization of government or the likelihood for 
violence and terrorism motivated by politics (World Bank). A high score (like 
Sweden) means that the political stability is perceived to be high, but a low score (like 
Spain, UK) means that the political stability is perceived to be low. Regqua fluctuates 
the least, and this is the indicator with the highest minimum value, showing high 
quality, although the mean is at about the same level as corruption and ruleoflaw.  
 
We can also see that there are big differences between the countries on union density. 
As expected, the Nordic countries like Sweden and Denmark have the highest density, 
while Spain, Estonia and France has the lowest union density. However, data for 
Bulgaria, Cyprus, Latvia, and Lithuania is missing from the OECD database. Data on 
union density is relevant for the quality of institutions because countries with high 
union density have institutions that take the interest of the society as a whole into 
account (Olson, 1982, p. 92). Olson talked more about the fragmentation of the unions, 
however I do not possess data on that, only on union density. We could, however, also 
claim that more comprehensive unions hinder growth (Olson, 1982, p. 107). The 
statistical analysis will hopefully provide us with some answers.  
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3.4. CONTROL VARIABLE - ECONOMIC GROWTH 
 
I include data on log GDP per capita gathered from the OECD statistics database as a 
control variable for the economic growth in the country (OECD, 2014). I expect that 
FDI inflows are lower in the time after a drop in GDP per capita. As this is such an 
important indicator of a country’s economic development and therefore for the quality 
of the institutions, I will include the variable in all the models except the replication 
model based on Gropp and Kostial’s analysis. The measure is taken from Eurostat, 
measuring nominal GDP per capita in current Euros per inhabitant.  
 
Table 9 Descriptive statistics GDP per capita and Log-transformed GDP per capita 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
GDP per capita 315 23953.33 13981.26 3600 80700 
Log GDP per capita 315 9.893 0.664 8.188 11.298 
!
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3.5. TIME SERIES CROSS-SECTIONAL DATA: PANEL DATA 
 
As a researcher or a student, you would like to make contributions to the research 
literature. In the quantitative sciences, you want to infer as much as possible from the 
available data. Cross-sectional data give you the possibility of comparing different 
units, while time-series data make it possible to study a phenomenon over time. By 
combining these, you have cross-sectional time-series data, often referred to as panel 
data. By measuring multiple variables over time, the amount of measuring-points 
grow, something that mends some of the main issues in comparative studies in the 
social sciences, that there are too many variables and too few observations (Lijphart, 
1971).  
 
The variables in the analyses are measured both across countries and time. As 
previously explained, the panel data is a favorable tool for researching changes over 
time – both in time and space. There are many different models I can use in STATA 
for this purpose, and earlier research has not shown that one specific model is superior 
to others, rather that different models suit different data structures. However, I argue 
that Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) modeling with Panel Corrected Standard Errors 
(PCSE) suit the data structure I have; a short time-series.  
 
Quantitative research in general, and panel data analyses specifically, has been 
criticized for overconfidence in the results from the analysis. Some of the criticism 
comes from simply believing that time-series analysis and panel data analysis gives x 
times t observations. More often than not, autocorrelation will reduce the actual 
number of observations, making the analysis less robust than wanted (Pennings, 
Keman Hans, & Kleinnijenhuis, 2009, p. 43). Also, heterogeneity is an issue panel 
data has to solve. I will return to this after a discussion on Feasible Generalized Least 
Squares versus Ordinary Least Squares analysis.  
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3.5.1. WHY NOT FEASIBLE GENERALIZED LEAST SQUARES (FGLS)? 
 
As noted earlier in the thesis, Gropp and Kostial used a model often used in panel data 
analysis; Feasible Generalized Least Squares. This is an econometric analysis offered 
in most of the software packages available, and was introduced for TSCS data by 
Richard Parks in 1967. In short, GLS is used to handle heteroscedasticity and 
correlation between the observations, so as to make the estimation more efficient 
(Parks, 1967)10. Also, it should handle unit specific serial correlation (Beck & Katz, 
1995, p. 637). These issues have always been a challenge for panel data, and made 
many scholars rule OLS out as the best linear unbiased estimator (BLUE).  
 
GLS has over time been criticized by many scholars, in particular in the article What 
to do (And not to do) with time-series cross-section data, written by Nathaniel Beck 
and Jonathan Katz (Beck & Katz, 1995). When using the Parks method of GLS, the 
size of the error terms are underestimated, as the method assumes knowledge about the 
error processes, knowledge that we do not have (Beck & Katz, 1995, p. 634). Since we 
do not have that knowledge, the Parks method, according to Beck and Katz, should be 
referred to as a feasible GLS estimator, estimating the errors. As a consequence, 
“[…]the Parks method falsely inflates confidence in the findings of TSCS studies” 
(Beck & Katz, 1995, p. 634). Importantly, the error processes are more complicated 
for panel data than just cross-sectional or time-series data. Had the error processes 
been known, then the GLS method would be preferable, however, the error processes 
rarely, if ever, are (Beck & Katz, 1995, p. 637).  
 
Gropp and Kostial (2000) used the feasible GLS analysis that Beck and Katz criticize. 
As they use the level of significance as a basis for their conclusions, the critique from 
Beck and Katz is timely, as the FGLS estimator might underestimate the error terms.  
Also, they used fixed effects, which is discouraged for shorter time series 
(Buddelmeyer, Jensen, Oguzoglu, & Webster, 2008). In chapter 4, I will show how 
using a different estimator might change the results in a substantive way.  
                                            
10 For more information on how the GLS estimator works 
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3.5.2. WHY ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES (OLS)? 
 
Using ordinary OLS regression with panel data was for a long time criticized for the 
same flaws that Beck and Katz found with FGLS estimators. Thus, using OLS is not 
necessarily without challenges. One of the main criteria for OLS to be BLUE (Best 
Linear Unbiased Estimator) is that the error terms are independent of each other. In 
panel data analysis, there is reason to believe that the error term for variable x in 
country z in year t in some way is correlated with the error term for variable x in 
country z in year t2. Also, the error terms for two different variables in the same year 
may also be correlated. Thus, the prerequisites for using OLS will not be fulfilled, and 
we will need to optimize this if we are to use the OLS regressions (Beck & Katz, 1995, 
p. 636).  However, if we are able to correct the correlation of the errors, the OLS 
estimator becomes more consistent and efficient than FGLS estimators. This should be 
possible with panel data because we have information on the correlation of the errors 
over time (Beck & Katz, 1995, p. 638). By knowing this, we can introduce Panel-
Corrected Standard Errors (PCSE). Beck and Katz tested the PCSE model in a Monte 
Carlo experiment, and found that the accuracy of the OLS with PCSE is much higher 
than Parks method of GLS (Beck & Katz, 1995, p. 640): “[…] Thus, PCSEs dominate 
OLS standard errors; when PCSEs are not necessary, they perform as well as the OLS 
standard errors, and when OLS standard errors perform poorly, PCSEs still perform 
well”.  
3.5.3. TROUBLE LURKING IN THE WATER 
 
Even if the PCSEs make the OLS estimator better than FGLS, there could still be 
trouble lurking in the water. In particular, autocorrelation, heteroscedasticity in the 
residuals, correlated residuals because of exogenous shocks, and endogeneity are 
issues I have to confront in the analysis.  
 
The issue of endogeneity arises when an explanatory variable is correlated with the 
error term (Wooldridge, 2002, p. 50). Usually, the endogeneity comes from one of 
three ways (Wooldridge, 2002, pp. 50-51): (1) omitted variables, where you, because 
of a lack of variables to control for, get a correlation between the variables and the 
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error term. Usually you include a variable that is correlated in some way with an 
excluded variable, and the explained variation is therefore in the error term. This 
reduces the explained variation, as well as raises the insecurity in the analysis, and is 
often referred to as omitted variable bias. (2) Measurement errors, where you want to 
measure a phenomenon, but the data only partly measures it. Wooldridge use the 
difference between the marginal tax rate and average tax rate as an example 
(Wooldridge, 2002, p. 51). (3) Simultaneity, which happens when the explaining 
variable(s) are determined at the same time with y, so that the chain of causality is not 
clear. An example would be the relationship between car accidents and speed limits, 
where the number of car accidents might also affect the speed limits. The theoretic 
expectation of the direction of causality is the best way of preventing problems of 
endogeneity. Also, one can use the results from the econometric analysis, as counter-
intuitive results can happen because of endogeneity problems.  
 
Heteroscedasticity occurs when the variance of the residuals is dependent on the 
values of the explanatory variables (Midtbø, 2012, p. 106). While heteroscedasticity 
does not affect the explained variance (R2), and the OLS estimator is still unbiased, the 
standard errors and confidence intervals are affected. As we want homoscedasticity in 
our data, we have different possibilities, but what turns out to be most efficient with 
my data structure is, introducing panel-corrected standard errors (Midtbø, 2012, p. 
109). By including panel corrected standard errors in the OLS PCSE method, the 
problem of heteroscedasticity is reduced (Beck & Katz, 1995).  
 
When the residuals are correlated with each other over time, Autocorrelation is present 
(Midtbø, 2012, p. 112). This represents a breach of the prerequisite for OLS 
estimation: no correlation in the residuals. By ignoring this, the standard errors are 
underestimated, and the significance numbers, overestimated. By adding a lagged 
dependent variable on the right hand side of the equation, the problem is reduced 
(Beck & Katz, 1996, 4). There can also be simultaneous correlation, where for 
instance geographically close units (as countries) experience common shocks, or quite 
simply compare more favorable to each other than to countries farther away. By 
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adding PCSE into the OLS estimator, this problem should as well be reduced. I will 
control for autocorrelation by including the autoregressive function (AR1) in STATA, 
as there are theoretical reasons to expect autocorrelation when using stock level data. 
The face validity of the claim that the stock level of FDI in t is affected to a large 
degree by the stock level in t-1 is high, and it might also be affected to some degree by 
the level in t-2 and t-3. 
 
I can also face unit and time specific effects, such as exogenous shocks and country-
specific attributes that are difficult to measure in the analysis. A possible solution to 
this is to use a Fixed Effects model. When choosing whether to use a Fixed Effects 
model, the rule of thumb is that the time points should be larger than 20 if you are to 
use the FE model. In my analysis, I analyze the research question using data in a time 
span shorter than 20 years; so using the FE is not recommended. Also, by using the FE 
model, I exclude the possibility of comparing countries as information, as the model 
only uses “within-country” information (Wooldridge, 2002, p. 267). I return to this in 
3.6.1, but first I want to explain the OLS PCSE model. 
3.6. OLS WITH PANEL-CORRECTED STANDARD ERRORS 
 
The previous paragraphs have shown that OLS with PCSE is a good model to use with 
the data structure in my thesis. I have accounted for and clarified the possibilities and 
challenges you face when choosing which model to base your analysis on, and OLS 
with PCSEs will give more correct output than for instance the FGLS model that 
Gropp and Kostial used. Beck and Katz put the OLS PCSE through Monte Carlo 
experiments, and showed that the errors generated by PCSE were completely 
independent of the explanatory variables, and were on average more accurate than 
Park’s method (Beck & Katz, 1995, pp. 641-642). By using OLS PCSE analysis, I will 
by default reduce the probablility for heteroscedasticity and simultaneity, as pointed 
out by Beck and Katz. The issue of endogeneity is still present, although reduced. 
Omitted variable bias is difficult to control for in the sense that you have a theoretical 
point of departure. Also, there is a need for a discussion on the degree to which the 
phenomena I want to control for is measured by the indicators I include. I will return 
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to these questions in the next chapter. To reduce the risk of autocorrelation, I will 
include autoregressive variables in the analysis. There is a theoretical argument to 
support this. As I am using stock level data, the level of FDI in year t1 is dependent of 
the value in t0, therefore it is important to include the measure both for 
methodological, but also theoretical reasons.  
3.6.1. HOW ABOUT THE FINANCIAL CRISIS – “LAGGING THE DOG”? 
 
Now and again countries experience shocks common to all countries – like the 
financial crisis that hit most of the developed world in 2007 and 2008. The European 
Union was hit quite dramatically, as we can see in figure 3 as well. This is an external 
shock, which is not easy to control for using the statistical analyses I have accounted 
for thus far, as I am mostly looking at variation between countries in the OLS PCSE, 
auto regressive models and the FGLS-models. However, by using a Fixed Effects-
model (FE), I can account for external shocks that happen simultaneously in all 
countries by looking at within-country variation. This is done by including dummy-
variables for each country, and by giving each unit its own constant term. However, 
this method does not come without drawbacks. First, FE models have serious 
problems with estimating time-invariant and rarely changing variables (Plümper & 
Troeger, 2007, p. 124), in particular important for the institutional variables used in 
this analysis, but also the tax variable in some countries. Second, using FE estimators 
with short time spans rarely fosters robust results, and research has shown that OLS is 
in fact BLUE when t<20 (Buddelmeyer H., Jensen, Oguzoglu, & Webster, 2008). 
Because of this, I will not base my main analysis on the FE model, but I will include 
this as a robustness test. Using Fixed Effects model also has consequences for the 
substantial interpretation of the analysis, as the model can give non-significant results 
for an explanatory variable that actually is significant, just because it is relatively time-
invariant (Buddelmeyer H., Jensen, Oguzoglu, & Webster, 2008, p. 2). Also, Beck & 
Katz argued that leaving out the FE could be better (or rather, less worse) than 
including them, especially since collinearity becomes a problem with the FE model, 
and you risk losing important information from the analysis (Beck, 2001, p. 285). I 
have some variables included in the analysis that do not change significantly from year 
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to year (especially the tax level and the institutional variables for certain countries), 
and this can reduce the explanatory power of the FE model. I will, however, include 
the model as a test of robustness, especially considering the magnitude of the financial 
crisis in 2007-2008 and the repercussions this brought, that could have substantial 
implications for my results. 
 
I will now proceed with my analysis: I will first replicate Gropp and Kostial’s analysis 
using the feasible GLS analysis with fixed effects for my time period. Second, I will 
then perform the same analysis; this time using an OLS PCSE model. Finally, I will 
include political variables in the analysis. Remembering the hypotheses from chapter 
2, I expect that the importance of the corporate tax rate to be reduced as a consequence 
of including political variables.   
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4. ANALYSIS 
 
We have finally arrived to the most exciting part of the thesis, where theory, methods 
and variables meet. I want to test the hypotheses set out in the beginning of my thesis, 
based on the theories on tax competition and the role of political institutions. After the 
chapter on the OLI-paradigm, we have learned that both institutional and tariff based 
considerations are used when MNE’s decides whether to invest. Earlier research on the 
field of FDI has included papers on institutions and taxes, but for the most part in 
isolation (Fatica, 2010, p. 1). Most, if not all, of the studies on taxation and FDI 
concludes that high taxes affect inward FDI flows in a negative sense, and some 
studies has shown that a reduction of corporate tax rates in high-tax countries may 
benefit their inward FDI flows (Gropp & Kostial, 2000, p. 8).  
 
I shall now test the theoretical arguments and see whether institutions matter more 
than the corporate tax rates. Before going to the substantial discussion, I will in 4.1 try 
to give an overview of the data through descriptive statistics, before I in 4.2 give an 
outline of the baseline model, and show what happens when we go from a FGLS 
model with Random Effects to an OLS PCSE model. This lays the foundation for the 
rest of the analysis, where I go more into the specific effects of tax and institutions, 
before I finish the chapter with some robustness tests, where I use different 
operationalizations of the institutional variables.   
4.1. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
Before we embark on the OLS analysis, it is useful to get an idea on how the data 
looks. I have therefore computed panel data plots showing the development of the 
variables of interest. The first plot shows the development of annual level of inward 
stock FDI measured relative to GDP for each country, while the dashed line represents 
the development of the Effective Average Tax Rates (EATR) for the same countries. 
As we can see, Luxembourg inflates the scale, making it more difficult to interpret, as 
they have FDI levels of close to 400% of GDP in some years, but excluding the 
country does not change the findings substantially. We can see that the general level of 
FDI has grown the last 15 years, while the average tax rate has dropped in most of the 
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countries. It is interesting to see that even though Ireland has raised their tax rates, the 
level of FDI does not seem to be affected by it (at least not in this plot). There does not 
seem to be a large drop in FDI relative to GDP in the aftermath of the financial crisis, 
but the scale makes it difficult to see. Luxembourg probably makes the best case, 
where FDI is such a big portion of the economy, and we can clearly see a drop in FDI 
around 2007-2008.  
 
Figure 12 Development of FDI and tax 
 
 
This figure does not tell us much about the relationship between the variables, so I 
made a new plot showing the bivariate correlations between FDI per GDP and EATR 
(figure 13). The plot shows the mean value of each indicator for each country, and not 
surprisingly, the expected relationship is as earlier research has claimed (we will return 
to this question in the econometric analysis), and higher taxes reduce the inward FDI. 
As we can see, Ireland and to some extent Luxembourg represents the outliers, while 
the large economies of France, Germany and Spain end the spectrum with high taxes 
and low values of FDI per GDP. As written, this is only the mean value, and it is thus 
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too early to conclude. I will therefore continue with the bivariate correlations between 
FDI per GDP and the institutional variables.  
 
Figure 13 Average bivariate correlations between FDI per GDP and EATR 
 
 
When looking at the fitted values for the next figure, there seems to be a positive 
relationship between FDI per GDP and a positive score on corruption. Again, 
Luxembourg represents an outlier, with a high score on both variables, but removing 
Luxembourg from the analysis barely changes the fitted line through the plot. Not 
surprising, it is the Nordic countries that have the highest score on the corruption 
variable, while the post-communist states have the lowest scores. Perhaps more 
surprising is that they do not necessarily have more inward FDI, at least not relative to 
their national GDP. 
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Figure 14 Average bivariate correlations between FDI per GDP and corruption 
 
Figure 15 Average bivariate correlations between FDI per GDP and political stability 
 
 
When looking at how the bivariate relationship between FDI per GDP and the 
indicator polstab (political stability and fear of terrorism) pans out, you see that there 
is a positive relationship between the FDI indicator and a high score on polstab, 
similar to the earlier plots. I include the two last indicators below, first regqua 
(regulatory quality) and then ruleoflaw (the rule of law in the countries). The results 
follow the theoretical expectations, where high scores on the indicators coincide with 
higher levels of FDI per GDP. Again it is the post-communist countries that have the 
lowest score on the institutional variables. 
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Figure 16 Average bivariate correlations between FDI per GDP and regulatory quality 
 
 
Figure 17 Average bivariate correlations between FDI per GDP and rule of law 
 
 
Figure 18 Average bivariate correlations between tax and rule of law 
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Figure 18 shows us the bivariate correlations between the Effective Average Tax Rate 
and ruleoflaw. I could have used any of the other institutional variables, as they show 
the same result. There seems to be a positive relationship between taxes and good 
governance, in that countries with a higher score on the institutional indicators also 
have relatively high tax rates. This seems to support Acemoglu’s (2000) theory that 
some countries can have higher tax rates and still attract investments, certainly if the 
revenues are spent on public goods important for the investors. Ireland represents the 
biggest outlier, together with Italy. The countries are interesting in their own way; 
Ireland because they have low taxes but high scores on the institutional variables; Italy 
because of the opposite, they have higher taxes, but some of the lowest scores on the 
institutional variables.  
4.2. BASELINE MODEL 
 
Table 10 shows us the differences between the Feasible Generalized Least Squares 
Random Effects and the Ordinary Least Squares Panel-Corrected Standard Errors 
models. Remembering from 3.5.1, FGLS underestimates the error terms, leading to 
overconfidence in the results. We can see from the table that this is at least partly 
confirmed in the data material. First, the error term of the EATR measure and the 
amount of total FDI flows grows. As expected, the effect of the tax variable stays 
negative, but is no longer significant. We can conclude from this replication that 
Gropp and Kostial’s findings not necessarily are wrong, only that the model 
specification used most likely is not the best estimator. The results are (as of yet) not 
robust enough to accept the conclusion that lower tax rates increases the FDI in the 
host economy – these preliminary results do not give reason for making such a claim. 
However, this is not the ending point of my analysis, this is only the beginning. I have 
showed what I wanted to show, that model specification and robustness testing is 
important for the validity of the empirical analysis.  
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Table 10 Feasible Generalized Least Squares vs. Ordinary Least Squares with Panel Corrected Standard Errors. 
Dependent variable: FDI stocks per GDP 
VARIABLES COEFFICIENTS 
 FGLS RE OLS PCSE (AR1) 
Tax -0.313 0.041 
 (-1.11) (0.09) 
   
Growth -1.758* -1.638* 
 (-5.87) (-2.94) 
   
Inflation (lagged) -0.442 -0.638 
 (-0.94) (-1.07) 
   
Exchange rate -0.066 -0.068 
 (-1.01) (-1.40) 
   
Trade (share of GDP) 0.677* 0.602* 
 (12.11) (4.08) 
   
Total FDI (in and out) 36.16* 21.98 
 (4.35) (1.28) 
   
Constant -7.414 -8.929 
 (-0.64) (-0.39) 
R2 0.754 0.356 
N 303 303 
t statistics in parentheses, + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05 
 
Of a possible 315 observations, we have 303, and the average country has 14,5 
observations (of a possible 15). In particular, Luxembourg affects the results (both as 
an outlier and with only 10 observations), but removing it from the analysis does not 
alter the results significantly. This analysis has rather weaker results than earlier 
research, especially when looking at the tax indicator and the total FDI flows indicator. 
What does this tell us? It shows the importance of robustness tests, as this FGLS 
model did not survive the change to OLS PCSE. I am content with showing how 
model specifications in many ways decide how the substantial results are. By choosing 
the FGLS model, Gropp and Kostial underestimated their errors and may have 
overestimated the effects taxes have on FDI. This is even more obvious when looking 
at the explained variance (R2) that drops significantly from the first to the second 
model.  However, it is clear that the analysis needs to be expanded to give a sufficient 
explanation on how corporate taxes might affect the inflows of FDI.  
! !  62 
4.3. OLS PCSE – POLITICS INCLUDED 
 
Now, in the proceedings hereon out, I will first introduce a partial table where I 
include one new variable in each model, in total 6. The first model is the same model 
as on the last page, and the final model includes all the variables for the analysis. 
However, I will also include the variable motorway and a log-transformed GDP per 
capita indicator as control variables in every model. The second model adds only the 
corruption variable, while the third model includes all explanatory variables, and they 
are all made using an OLS PCSE model, as recommended by Beck and Katz (1995; 
2001). I use the autoregressive (AR1) option to eliminate autocorrelation by lagging 
the dependent variable.  
 
I will go through the analysis thoroughly, as follows: First, I will discuss the results in 
general, before I continue with each indicator. After this is done, I will proceed with 
robustness tests to see whether we can trust the results, and discuss how the model 
specifications change the preconditions for the analysis. I will then test the hypotheses 
to see whether they make it through the tests or not, before concluding in chapter 5. 
If I claimed that there was not much to say substantially in the last model, there are a 
lot to say about these. First and foremost, it is obvious that it’s not only the input that 
decides the output, but also what instruments you use to prepare the output.  
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Table 11 OLS PCSE - stage 1-3. Dependent variable: FDI stocks per GDP 
VARIABLES COEFFICIENTS 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Tax -0.121 -0.706 -1.026* 
 (-0.28) (-1.33) (-2.40) 
    
Growth -1.377* -1.461* -0.767 
 (-2.56) (-2.11) (-1.20) 
    
Inflation (lagged) -0.100 -0.119 0.523 
 (-0.16) (-0.17) (0.76) 
    
Exchange rate 0.016 0.025 -0.055 
 (0.47) (1.45) (-1.53) 
    
Trade (share of GDP) 0.532* 0.513* 0.538* 
 (3.79) (3.92) (5.81) 
    
Total FDI 18.60 34.93+ 18.40 
 (1.11) (1.78) (1.00) 
    
GDP per capita (log) 17.84* 12.88+ 12.96* 
 (3.06) (1.90) (2.20) 
    
Motorway per sq.km.  0.350* 0.398* 
  (2.38) (2.65) 
    
Corruption  -0.004 0.150 
  (-0.02) (0.54) 
    
Employment   -0.766 
   (-1.05) 
    
Union density   -0.150 
   (-1.54) 
    
Constant -176.4* -118.7+ -85.54 
 (-2.50) (-1.76) (-1.27) 
R2 0.353 0.534 0.625 
N 303 212 173 
t statistics in parentheses 
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05 
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First of all, we can see that the explanatory power of the tax variable grows from the 
first to the third model, and when including the log-transformed GDP per capita in the 
analysis, the tax indicator gains significance. A raise in the taxes of one percentage 
point reduces the stock value of FDI per GDP by 1.026, showing a strong and negative 
relationship between the variables. Removing the log-transformed GDP per capita 
makes the tax indicator strongly significant and negative in all three models, and this 
may explain why earlier research has given a lot of weight to the tax rates in this field 
of research. However, the log-transformed GDP per capita indicator has shown to be 
important in questions of economic behavior, because it accounts for differences in 
economic development between countries. There is reason to believe that there is a 
systematic difference between Ireland and Spain on the one hand, and Sweden and 
Denmark on the other, especially considering the growth of GDP over time.  
 
In model 2, I have included the institutional variables. The infrastructure measure is 
thought to measure the output of government investments, while corruption captures 
the perceived level of good governance in the countries. The explanatory power of 
motorways per square kilometer, measuring the importance of infrastructure to FDI, is 
strong in both model 2 and, as we shall see, in model 311. Specifically, by adding one 
kilometer of motorway per square kilometer raises the stock value of FDI per GDP by 
0.398. This may indicate that using output measures on public expenditure is 
underestimated in the literature, but I will return to that in the robustness tests. So far, 
it seems that higher investments in infrastructure in general, and road infrastructure 
specifically, is good for foreign investors. However, this effect might be exaggerated, 
as investments in the primary sector are more reliant on good road infrastructure than 
for instance investments in IT. The findings support the research of Bellak et al. 
(2008).  
 
 
 
                                            
11 This effect is nearly as strong when controlling for population as well, showing the importance of a high 
activity level in the public sector (regression not shown) 
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Corruption shows a counter-intuitive result in model 2, as a lower score on the 
indicator (higher expected corruption) is good for inward FDI. The coefficients are 
non-significant in both model 2 and 3, and changing the indicator with others from the 
Worldwide Governance Indicators dataset does not change this. Comparing the 
findings in model 2 to the bivariate correlations, this is not as expected, and may be an 
indicator of the sensitivity of model specifications, especially using short time-series 
as I do. Although the coefficient is positive in model 3, it is still not significant, and is 
thus difficult to interpret. For now, it seems as if higher corruption may give more FDI 
to a country, but we will need to test the robustness using different measures. There is 
a lot of research on the relationship between corruption and investment, and the 
findings in general do not support the findings in this analysis; corruption is bad for 
business. Therefore it is important to remember that the variation on the variable is not 
necessarily large enough to foster robust results, as later analyses in the thesis also will 
show (Skog, 2010, p. 91). If I had included countries with more corruption, e.g. Sub-
Saharan countries in Africa or South American countries, we might have seen a 
different outcome.  
 
In model 3, I include the industrial variables employment and union density, intended 
to capture the situation on the labor market. None of the indicators are significant, thus 
difficult to interpret. However, the indicators of GDP per capita and infrastructure are 
still significant, showing that government growth and investments in infrastructure is 
positive for investments in the countries. As well, the effect of taxes is significant in 
this model, and this gives us a point of direction. So far, it seems that both tax levels 
and government activities play a part for attracting investments. 
 
 I have no reason to claim that Gropp and Kostial were wrong in their analysis, as the 
relationship between tax rates and FDI still is present in my analysis. However, it 
seems that institutions do in fact matter, even though I have not (so far) been able to 
prove that they matter more. This becomes also clearer when looking at the one 
indicator for public goods, motorway per square kilometer, measuring the kilometers 
of motorway in each country, relative to the country size. The indicator is strong, 
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positive and significant at the 0,05% level. In the robustness tests, it will be interesting 
to see whether this holds up even when including other indicators of public goods.  
4.4. ROBUSTNESS 
 
Model specifications determine (to a large degree) the outcome of the analysis, 
especially in analyses with short time-series. A weakness in political science in 
general, and quantitative research specifically, is that scholars seldom challenge their 
models using different methods of robustness tests. Therefore, I want to do robustness 
tests in two ways; First, I will run a Fixed Effects analysis to control for exogenous 
shocks. If the financial crisis struck all the EU member states in a similar way, OLS 
PCSE and FGLS RE may not capture that phenomenon, because they look at variation 
within states more than between states, as FE models can. Therefore, if the results 
change in a substantial way using FE models, there is reason to believe that I cannot 
make conclusions based on my data material, as FE models should at least have t>20. 
In 4.3.2 I will challenge my analysis using different indicators thought to capture some 
of the same phenomena. I will include data on average (arithmetic) wages, input and 
output data on governmental spending on education, and use the Transparency 
International corruption scores instead of the WGI corruption indicator. If the results 
change in a substantial way, there is trouble in the analysis, and we cannot make 
strong conclusions based on the findings. Therefore, it is significant to test the data on 
model and input specifications.  
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4.4.1. FIXED EFFECTS 
 
The next table (table 12, p. 68) gives us two new columns of data. The input is the 
same, but I have used two different models in this analysis. The first column is the 
same as model 3 in the last table, the complete OLS PCSE (AR1) model. The second 
column is a Fixed Effects FGLS model. There are not a lot of changes in the models; 
the only substantial change is that employment is statistically significant at the 0,01% 
level. Although I have explained why Fixed Effects can be a bad idea when using 
short time-series, it can work as a robustness test because it can control for the 
financial crisis and the Euro crisis, exogenous shocks that can affect all countries at the 
same time. As well, it reduces the risk of omitted variable bias, and may give robust 
results that at the same time remain conservative (Beck & Katz, 1996). 
 
As we can see, the conclusions from the OLS PCSE models have survived the 
robustness test so far. Using FGLS FE does not change the coefficients in a drastic 
way, and this increases the robustness of the analysis. It is interesting, though, that the 
infrastructure indicator loses significance in the FE model, but the impact of the GDP 
per capita indicator is higher than in the OLS PCSE model. However, I am not 
satisfied with this. As the infrastructure variable is so strong in all the analyses, I want 
to include more variables measuring the output of governmental spending on goods 
regarded as important for investors investing in the country. I will therefore do a new 
OLS PCSE analysis using different measures.  
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Table 12 Robustness test 1. Dependent variable: FDI stocks per GDP 
VARIABLES COEFFICIENTS 
 OLS PCSE (AR1) FGLS FE 
Tax -1.026* -0.920* 
 (-2.40) (-2.16) 
   
Growth -0.767 -0.540 
 (-1.20) (-1.34) 
   
Inflation (lagged) 0.523 0.283 
 (0.76) (0.45) 
   
Exchange rate -0.055 0.119 
 (-1.53) (0.88) 
   
Trade (share of GDP) 0.538* 0.229+ 
 (5.81) (1.68) 
   
Total FDI (in and out) 18.40 29.16* 
 (1.00) (2.86) 
   
GDP per capita (log) 12.96* 25.61* 
 (2.20) (2.36) 
   
Motorway per sq.km. 0.398* 0.436 
 (2.65) (0.76) 
   
Corruption 0.150 0.075 
 (0.54) (0.19) 
   
Employment -0.766 -0.631 
 (-1.05) (-0.52) 
   
Union density -0.150 0.132 
 (-1.54) (0.19) 
   
Constant -85.54 -192.1 
 (-1.27) (-1.46) 
R2 0.625 0.638 
N 173 173 
t statistics in parentheses 
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05 
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4.4.2. CHANGING THE INDICATORS 
 
In this section, I present a new table with 5 columns of interest (in table 13). The first 
model (3) in the table is the complete OLS PCSE analysis, using annual FDI stock 
level data per GDP as the dependent variable. In model 4, I include wages, which 
captures the annual average wages in the units, measured in 2012 US Dollars PPPs and 
constant prices (gathered from the OECD statistics database), so that the numbers are 
comparable from year to year. The indicator is thought to capture the cost of labor in 
the country, and a positive coefficient could mean that the quality of labor, as a proxy 
for quality of institutions, is important for investors. Looking at model 5, we can see 
that the variables corruption, employment, and union density are switched out with 
public money spent on education, and the number of students finishing tertiary 
education, measuring both the input and output of governmental spending on 
education. The former captures the total public expenditure on education as a 
percentage of GDP, for all levels of education. The measure is taken from the Eurostat, 
and is gathered for most of the EU member states. Data from Belgium and 
Luxembourg is to a large degree missing however, mostly because of a lack of 
universities in the beginning of the period. If more people in the country have finished 
a tertiary education, and higher government spending on education has positive 
coefficients, we can expect that good governance is important for investors. In model 6 
I include the corruption index from Transparency International, a rank from 1 to 10 
where high values indicates low perceived corruption. As the corruption data in model 
3, these are perceptions of corruption in the countries, and is therefore not an objective 
measure, but subjective. Ideally, you would want objective data, because it would give 
a better comparative measure, but this is hard to gather when it comes to quality of 
institutions and corruption. This raises some validity question related to the 
comparability in the data, and demands a careful interpretation of the results.  
 
The table is presented on the next page, and I will proceed by discussing each model. 
At a glance, we can see that the infrastructure indicator survives all the model 
specifications, together with growth and trade. GDP per capita loses importance in the 
last model, and the tax indicator is not significant in any of the alternative models.  
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Table 13 Robustness test 2. Dependent variable: FDI stocks per GDP 
VARIABLES COEFFICIENTS 
 (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Tax -1.026* -0.830 -0.468 -0.636 -0.424 
 (-2.40) (-1.50) (-1.03) (-1.21) (-0.89) 
      
Growth -0.767 -1.270* -1.114* -1.391* -0.966* 
 (-1.20) (-2.08) (-2.51) (-2.25) (-2.38) 
      
Inflation (lagged) 0.523 -0.138 -0.116 -0.0531 0.021 
 (0.76) (-0.24) (-0.24) (-0.09) (0.04) 
      
Exchange rate -0.055 0.0336 0.030 0.0369 0.0322 
 (-1.53) (1.16) (1.01) (1.42) (1.05) 
      
Trade (share of GDP) 0.538* 0.456* 0.506* 0.476* 0.516* 
 (5.81) (2.93) (6.37) (3.37) (6.24) 
      
Total FDI (in and out) 18.40 29.86+ 6.740 32.65+ 7.902 
 (1.00) (1.77) (0.48) (1.90) (0.56) 
      
GDP per capita (log) 12.96* -2.809 10.53* 18.10* 4.027 
 (2.20) (-0.26) (2.18) (2.24) (0.36) 
      
Motorway per sq.km.12 0.398* 0.455* 0.492* 0.490* 0.374* 
 (2.65) (2.17) (3.06) (2.63) (2.16) 
      
Corruption 0.150     
 (0.54)     
      
Employment -0.766     
 (-1.05)     
      
Union Density -0.150     
 (-1.54)     
      
Wages  0.001   0.001+ 
  (1.62)   (1.65) 
      
Education (spent)   1.971  3.304 
   (0.81)  (1.12) 
      
Education (students)   0.001  0.001 
   (0.50)  (0.66) 
      
Corruption (TI)    -3.023 -3.907+ 
    (-1.53) (-1.73) 
      
Constant -85.54 7.045 -118.5* -149.7+ -71.31 
 (-1.27) (0.07) (-2.20) (-1.80) (-0.70) 
R2 0.625 0.429 0.543 0.472 0.558 
N 173 243 223 247 221 
t statistics in parentheses 
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05 
                                            
12 I  have done the analysis with Internet users as a different measure of infrastructure, this did not change the 
picture.  
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By including wages in the second model (4), taxes quickly lose its importance, 
together with the economical indicator of GDP per capita. Although the average level 
of wages is not significant in this model, it goes to show that small changes in the 
input side of a statistical analysis can change the interpretation a lot. In model 5 I 
include the measures on education, with mostly the same consequences as model 4, 
although GDP per capita is significant again. Again, none of the education indicators 
are significant, and this makes it hard to interpret. In model 6, I include a new 
indicator on corruption, this time from Transparency International. As the WGI 
indicators, this is a subjective measure, using survey data on European countries. The 
indicator is strong and significant; showing again that a high level of corruption 
indicates higher investments in the country (at least measured by GDP). Model 7 is a 
new complete model (like model 3), this time with all the alternative measures. The 
tax indicator is not significant, as is not the indicator of economic growth, GDP per 
capita. However, we can see that the wage indicator is significant on a 0,1% level, 
showing that investments are higher in countries with higher average wage levels, 
although the effect might not be too strong. Interestingly, the corruption indicator is 
strong and negative, even when controlling for education and wage levels. If true, this 
is somewhat of a breakthrough in the research on FDI. However, I suspect that the 
short time period, mixed with the possibility of omitted variable bias and endogeneity 
issues, gives us several reasons to put doubts on that specific result. Also, the other 
models give no such reason to expect the relationship to be negative and significant, 
adding further reasons for suspicion. R-squared does not change a lot in this test. 
 
In sum, the data has survived the robustness tests to some degree, although the level of 
significance varies from model to model. I have tried to show that institutions do 
matter, and even if I have not been able to prove how much they matter, it seems clear 
that good governance and the quality of institutions should be included when looking 
at how taxes affect inward FDI. It is hard to look past the fact that companies paying 
taxes provide governments with revenues they can use on goods regarded as important 
for investors, lowering the importance of the tax rates, in line with the research of 
Acemoglu (2000) and others. 
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4.5. HOW DO THE HYPOTHESES FARE? 
 
In chapter 3, I made some hypotheses based on the theories outlined in chapter 2 and 
earlier research. How do these hypotheses hold out when faced with the statistical 
analysis? The first two hypotheses were related to the relationship between taxes and 
FDI. As the OLS PCSE analysis has shown, there is only some support for the first 
hypothesis, as the relationship in the complete model is significant and negative. The 
effect is not confirmed through the robustness tests, so there is reason to question the 
conclusion. I will therefore be careful to make a clear conclusion based on my 
empirical analyses, but it is interesting to see that the effect might not be as clear cut as 
earlier research has shown, especially when considering that my thesis has a longer 
time range than many other analyses. It could mean that the effect of tax rates is, at 
least to a certain extent, overrated. To be able to confirm the second hypothesis, that 
the effect of taxes is reduced when controlling for institutional indicators, I need 
significant results for the tax indicator in all models. Since the tax indicator is not clear 
until I include institutional indicators in model 3, this is difficult, and I cannot give full 
support for the hypothesis, although it might be that the effect of infrastructure and 
economic growth is so clear that taxes do not matter anymore. Because of the 
sensitivity of the model, I will not make that claim. What we can say is that indicators 
measuring infrastructure, economic growth and wages, are positive and significant. 
Therefore, it seems as if good governance does matter, even if it does not matter more 
than tax rates.  
 
There is strong support for the third hypothesis; the relationship between motorways 
and FDI is strong, positive and significant through all the stages in the OLS PCSE 
analysis. I will not put too much emphasis on the FE model in the robustness tests, 
because of reasons earlier elaborated. Thus, there is support for the claims made by 
Bellak et al. in that a reduction of transportation costs is important for the inflows of 
FDI, and that a good infrastructure system is important for the attractiveness of the 
countries in the analysis. This effect gains in strength when thinking of the integrated 
market in the EU, as countries without good infrastructure can easily be overlooked 
when investors decide where to establish themselves. Because the effect is stable and 
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significant in nearly all the models, there might be reason to question the robustness in 
the analysis. There might be a spurious effect in the analysis, not controlling for 
underlying variables affecting both infrastructure and the levels of FDI. I will return to 
this problem in the next chapter. 
 
Turning to the institutional and the industrial variables, the findings are substantially 
interesting, even if they are not revolutionary. First of all, none of the institutional or 
industrial indicators are significant in the main model (3). The closest is the density of 
labor unions, but this should only have a minor effect, even if it is a negative one. 
However, when we control for wages in the final model (7) of the robustness tests, we 
get ambiguous results. Even if more roads, better economic growth and higher wages 
are positive for the attractiveness of a country, they are outcompeted by the corruption 
coefficient, claiming that countries with higher levels of corruption are more attractive 
for investments than others. While this may be true in some sectors, as textile 
industries in East Asian countries where investors might go for low labor costs before 
looking at the level of corruption, I believe that this coefficient is troublesome, and 
should not be trusted. The theoretical expectations would be that good governance in 
the EU member states is important, but my analysis claims the opposite.  
 Although it may be that weak states in fact do have more FDI, this is not likely, 
especially when looking at most of the earlier work on the subject. We might therefore 
expect the results to not be as robust as we want them to be. This argument is further 
strengthened when looking at the industrial variables on employment and union 
density, both of which lack significant explanatory power. As such, it is difficult to 
claim support for H5, on the relationship between good governance and FDI. I will 
still claim that the relationship is present, even if the statistical models are not unitary 
in their findings, because of infrastructure, wages and economic growth being 
significant and positive.  
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I cannot claim support for H6, on the relationship between union density and FDI, and 
H7, on the relationship between employment levels and FDI, as they are not 
significant in any model. They are also the indicators with the least observations, 
respectively 276 and 251. The data is, as I have written earlier, difficult in some 
countries, as they do not necessarily have universities, or they have only recently 
gotten them, something that undermines the data13.  
 
The general point to make in this section is that hypotheses are judged as confirmed or 
denied on the basis of significance in the analysis. Small changes in the model 
specifications can alter the results in a substantial way, and I therefore want to point 
out that the analyses made in this thesis are not meaningless even though there is a 
lack of significant findings. On the contrary, it shows that when challenging your own 
data, correlations that seem to be significant and substantial, may not be so after all. 
Therefore, I will continue with discussing the challenges in the data and how the field 
of research can continue, based on the analyses made in this thesis.  I have pursued a 
balanced dataset, something that reduced the time period of the analysis, and since the 
effective average tax rate is only available from 1998-2012, this has limited the period 
of analysis. I could have changed this and used the statutory tax rates, giving me extra 
years. Even if this could have given me more significant results, it would not have 
happened without making compromises, as we can question the efficiency of the 
statutory tax rate measure, considering the exemptions and other schemes reducing the 
effective tax rate.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
13 Luxembourg got their first university, University of Luxembourg, in 2003.  
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5. DOWN THE ROAD  
 
We have seen how the statistical analyses have fared, and also how the estimates 
changes when met with different model specifications and different input. By and 
large, there seems to be a lot of insecurity in the data, making it hard to conclude. In 
this section I will first discuss the challenges in the data and how these challenges can 
be met, before I discuss where the research on institutions, taxes, and FDI can 
continue. There is a need for economists and political scientists to collaborate more on 
this subject in the future.  
5.1. CHALLENGES TO THE DATA 
 
There are several potential sources of error in the analysis. The first and most 
important is the short time period analyzed. Ideally, you want longer time periods 
when using panel data, so that you make sure you do not only look at a period that 
may be peculiar for some reason. In particular, when looking at EU member states, the 
ideal measure would be an analysis spanning from the Coal and Steel Community 
from 1952 and to today, but this is (of course) not possible with the data available. 
Most of the analyses looking at FDI use even shorter time periods than this thesis, but 
insofar that we are looking for robust and significant results, this source of error 
cannot be underestimated, and gives us reason to be extra careful in terms of model 
sensitivity. The robustness tests have, however, given us reason to believe that the data 
are more robust than maybe feared, and that we, at least to a certain extent, can rely on 
the validity in the data. It is interesting to see the short time periods analyzed in the 
literature; Bénassy-Quéré et al used 1984-2000, Gropp and Kostial used 1988-1997, 
and Devereux and Griffith used 1980-1994, and many more use even shorter time 
periods, some down to just 2 years. This is a methodological challenge that should not 
be underestimated, especially for students using the findings as facts in their own 
analyses. How do we solve this? There is a need for the EU and their member states to 
gather annual data on a lot of the action going around in the Union, so that scholars 
can use their statistical methods in a satisfying way. Quite paradoxically, we might 
need more public spending from the governments to prove that good governance has 
an effect on their attractiveness. 
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The second area of potential error in the thesis is omitted variable bias. There is reason 
to believe, as the OLI paradigm shows, that investors act in a way where many 
elements work together when deciding where to invest. The concept of institutions and 
good governance is not easy to operationalize, and Blonigen (2005) has shown that 
most of the scholars use expert surveys as I have done in my thesis. Using FE models 
might handle this, but then we would have a need for longer time series in the data. An 
example of the problems connected with omitted variable bias is measures on good 
governance. The infrastructure indicator was clearly significant in most analyses, and 
while this might mean that the effect is present, it might also be an indicator of weak 
robustness. Good governance can be difficult to measure objectively, but the problem 
would be smaller if there were different measures capturing the phenomenon. My 
experience is that there is so much multicollinearity across the material that using 
more than one of the subjective measures on good governance reduces the impact of 
the analysis. The development of objective measures of good governance is decisive 
for determining the importance of good governance. Some scholars have found a clear 
relationship between institutions and FDI (see Wei, 2000), but there is a problem 
connected to the lack of objective data.  
 
There is also the question of clusters. They represent the agglomeration of enterprises 
close to each other, and are often preferred because it gives enterprises the possibility 
of sharing ideas and competence, in addition to creating good technical environments. 
Many enterprises may prefer to be located in a given cluster, even though the tax level 
in the country is higher than others. Therefore, they are not interested in the country 
per se, but in the locality of the given cluster, for instance IT clusters in Ireland or 
energy clusters in Germany. I have not been able to capture this with my data, 
although research environments such as The European Cluster Observatory in 
Stockholm provide, but the data is sector-oriented, making it more difficult to use in a 
cross-sectorial analysis such as mine. If you can control for the effects of clusters, the 
effect of high tax rates might be reduced, at least in less labor-intensive and more 
high-technological industries where the availability of competent labor force may be 
of higher importance.  
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5.2. WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? 
 
In the next table we see the summary of hypotheses and how they faced the empirical 
analyses. Most of the hypotheses are not rejected because the correlation is clearly 
opposite of my original thoughts, but there is a lack of explanatory power in the data to 
confirm them. This supports the need to build more data both across countries and 
time to make it easier to research these subjects.  
 
Table 14 Summary of hypotheses 
Hypothesis Support 
H1: tax Partly 
H2: tax versus institutions No 
H3: infrastructure Yes 
H4: tax versus infrastructure No 
H5: good governance Partly 
H6: union density No 
H7: employment No 
H8: education No 
 
Sometimes it is important to ask the question: so what? In what way does this matter, 
and what should come after this? In this section of the thesis, I want to go through the 
implications of the findings in the empirical section, and where the research on how 
good governance and tax policy affects FDI should go. I will discuss this in two parts: 
the first methodologically, the second more substantially. I want to give three 
recommendations for the future research on this subject. 
 
The need for methodological discussion in research papers is there, and the sigh from 
Beck and Katz (1995), Scruggs (2007) and others, is needed in the research literature. 
Too many scholars fail to challenge their own data and use different model 
specifications – some even fail to present their model, so that we have to guess 
whether there is a 2SLS or a FGLS model. This goes against the goal of the social 
sciences of public procedures for the possibility of replicating the findings (Keohane, 
Verba, & King, 1994, p. 8). It is important that we challenge our data, so that we can 
reach the goal of robustness and inferences. If the social sciences cannot make 
inferences, there might not be such a big need for us. If we are to continue to use short 
time-series for our analyses,  we have to be able to explain why we use the models we 
! !  78 
use, as the data is sensitive and vulnerable to changes, and I would recommend more 
scholars to follow Beck and Katz’s OLS PCSE models, even if they reduce the chance 
of making inferences. It can seem as if too many scholars give priority to the goal of 
inference before the goal of reproducability and publicness to the data, and my first 
recommendation is therefore to be more open when it comes to modelling and choices 
the scholars make. 
5.2.1. WHAT ARE WE MEASURING – FDI DATA SOURCES 
 
I chose to use annual inward FDI stock level data, measured at country level. Many 
other scholars have used bilateral flows of FDI, some use company-level data, and 
some have chosen outward more than inward data. Firm-level data has the privilege of 
digging deeper into the material and seeing more specifically the strategic 
considerations made by the enterprises, and some have found signs on corporate tax 
rates playing a part in their considerations on investing abroad (Buettner & Ruf, 2007). 
While Buettner and Ruf used bilateral FDI flows on firm level, others have used 
bilateral flows or simply in (out) flows from countries (see Gropp and Kostial 2000; 
Bellak and Leibrecht 2005). While the different measures are all interesting, they 
measure different phenomena. When using firm-level data, you measure the strategic 
considerations of the firm, but when you use aggregated data on country-level, you 
measure how the tax rates impact the national flows of FDI, which might not be the 
same concept. This needs to be elaborated in the future, so that we are certain of what 
we are looking at.   
 
Up until this point, I have only barely touched upon sectorial differences and how the 
importance of taxes is relative to these differences. The resource-seeking MNEs are 
more likely to be less dependent on low taxes than for instance IT companies that can 
easily move between borders. Also, investments in natural resources are more capital-
intensive than other forms of investments, which could lead to differences in tax 
sensitivity. Earlier research has shown that this is the case, in particular in the 
secondary and tertiary sectors (Stöwhase, 2005)14. This makes it difficult to follow up 
                                            
14 However, the analysis was done with only 96 observations, with a model underestimating the errors. 
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Dunning’s all-encompassing paradigm in statistical analyses, and maybe Rajneesh 
Narula was right when claiming that we should take a step back and use the basics of 
the OLI paradigm when analyzing MNE activity (Narula, 2010). There might be a 
need to rather make sector-specific analyses that prioritizes more sector-specific 
indicators. Car manufacturers and IT companies have completely different needs, and 
this might not come through using country-level data. This also has consequences for 
the independent variables, as the IT company might need better broadband and more 
internet users, while the car manufacturer will be interested in better infrastructure and 
people wanting to buy their cars.   
 
Recognizing the differences between the investor’s interests in one sector rather than 
another will be crucial for the development of this field of research. I claim that the 
service sector is more tax-sensitive than industries in the primary sector, although this 
is hardly a controversial claim, as Stöwhase has shown. In his analysis of bilateral 
flows of FDI, he saw that for instance the mining and agricultural sectors were not 
particularly tax-sensitive, at least not compared to the tertiary sector (Stöwhase, 2005, 
p. 556) 
 
Also, there may be an effect that has not been touched upon in this thesis. The Single 
Market may be the one most important factor in the locational decision-making by the 
investors. No matter where an enterprise is located in the EU, it automatically gains 
access to the entire Single Market, an effect that should not be underestimated. In fact, 
access to the Single Market may be more important than any national regimes, so that 
the discussion on locational decision-making in the EU loses importance. I do still 
believe otherwise, especially in some sectors, but there should be no doubt that the 
Single Market may be the reason for establishment in the EU, even if it does not 
decide where in the EU to establish.  
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5.2.2. DATA ON GOOD GOVERNANCE 
 
Good data on institutional quality and good governance has been hard to come by, and 
much of the earlier research on the field has failed to show a correlation between for 
instance corruption and inward FDI (Wei, 2000, p. 1). There is an ongoing discussion 
on whether subjective or objective measures are the best to use, and one could 
question if there is such a thing as objective good governance. I chose to use subjective 
measures on corruption in addition to output measures on infrastructure and economic 
growth, as many has done before me, but there seems to be a need for better data on 
good governance. The subjective measures in the WGI database that I, and many other 
scholars, have used are highly correlated; they are also highly correlated with other 
similar measures such as the corruption measure from Transparency International. 
This makes the research difficult, especially when scholars fail to include the model 
specifications as well, so that we do not know how troublesome the possible 
multicollinearity is. Other scholars have done as me, and used other measures as 
proxies for government performance (see Globerman and Shapiro, 2002), but this is 
not necessarily the way to go, as corrupt countries can build new and large motorways 
and have many Internet users. In addition, the corruption levels in the member states in 
the European Union are in general low, so that it is not necessarily easy to see the 
differences. 
 
What are high quality institutions? Structures that support business might downplay 
other important aspects such as labor protection and other measures that can be a part 
of the concept of good governance. It seems clear to me that institutional qualities that 
are good for business are the most important measures in this regard, and there is a 
need to develop a better framework for measuring and capturing the phenomenon of 
good governance. One of the most important reasons for this is that there is a lot of 
information in the qualitative social sciences that can contribute to expand the existing 
empirical literature in not only quantitative social sciences, but also economics, and it 
represents an important bridge between the branches of science.  
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5.2.3. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF TRANSFER PRICING 
POLICIES IN THE EU 
 
Transfer pricing is a large issue connected to the reliability of the FDI data. I 
referenced the former French president Sarkozy in the introduction from when Ireland 
wanted financial support in the aftermath of the financial crisis, and France claimed 
that Ireland should not get that support without raising their tax rates. When we then 
see how Facebook, who chose Ireland as the country for their subsidiary, pay £2.9 
million in taxes while generating nearly £840 million in revenues, this clearly 
represents a challenge (Neate, 2012). They do this by moving money from Ireland and 
other countries to tax havens as the Cayman Islands, clearly with the only goal of 
reducing their tax base. Suddenly, a big gain has turned into a loss, as Facebook 
reported an annual loss of £15 million. I will not claim that this is something only 
Facebook does, as other companies such as Apple, Starbucks and Google have done 
the same thing with their subsidiaries in Ireland. Gropp and Kostial (2000) looked at 
the consequences of harmonizing the tax rates across the European Union, but I think 
that the issues of the difference in tax bases are more important and should be at the 
forefront of the Commissions work on harmful taxes.  
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6. CONCLUSION 
 
In this thesis, I have looked at how national tax regimes affect their attractiveness to 
FDI. More specifically, I have looked at how the expected relationship between taxes 
and FDI are when you include political and industrial institutions into the analysis. By 
basing my analysis on the article by Gropp and Kostial (2000), I built on earlier 
research in the field of international political economy and in the intersection between 
the social sciences and economy and International Business. My thesis has shown two 
things; first, that model specification and data sensitivity should not be taken lightly, 
especially when working with short time-series and relative homogenous units. By 
using the framework developed by Beck and Katz (1995), I showed how FGLS 
analyses underrate the standard errors, and that they therefore are overconfident in the 
correlations in the models. By changing from FGLS to OLS PCSE, the correlation 
coefficients changed quite dramatically. This underlines the need for scholars to 
challenge their own data and to use robustness tests to a bigger degree than they might 
do (or at least show in their analyses). The second point to take out of the thesis is that 
institutions matter. By including measures on economic growth and infrastructure, I 
have shown that government performance is important for investors. The fact that I 
failed to show that good governance, measured using WGI data, is as important as 
other measures, shows the need for developing a better framework for measuring 
governance quantitatively. This particular field of research is interesting, as it brings 
the best of the quantitative social sciences with the lines of research from economy 
and International Business, and the spillover-effects this might bring forth should not 
be underestimated.  
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Appendix 
The syntax (do-file) is over 40 pages long, and is too big to be included in the appendix. By sending an e-mail to 
kris.hanssen@gmail.com, I can provide the syntax and dataset. 
 
Table 15 Annual corporate tax revenue per GDP (OECD, 2013b) 
Country 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Austria 2,127 1,773 1,994 3,043 2,191 2,155 2,249 2,21 2,172 2,417 2,459 1,695 1,935 2,22 2,28 
Belgium 3,374 3,224 3,203 3,114 3,031 2,865 3,087 3,305 3,529 3,487 3,34 2,435 2,629 2,9 3,104 
Czech Republic 3,272 3,697 3,356 3,855 4,157 4,44 4,411 4,352 4,605 4,695 4,231 3,547 3,383 3,393 3,558 
Denmark 3,004 2,375 3,258 2,786 2,872 2,903 3,161 3,922 4,343 3,782 3,288 2,325 2,763 2,765 3,033 
Estonia 2,431 1,95 0,887 0,686 1,108 1,581 1,664 1,427 1,491 1,624 1,64 1,835 1,348 1,24 1,449 
Finland 4,325 4,33 5,895 4,189 4,169 3,403 3,518 3,334 3,387 3,871 3,485 2,028 2,551 2,731 2,188 
France 2,644 2,957 3,07 3,372 2,876 2,492 2,772 2,425 2,982 2,981 2,932 1,468 2,135 2,52 2,547 
Germany 1,591 1,781 1,811 0,603 1,019 1,269 1,554 1,797 2,183 2,254 1,961 1,396 1,568 1,749 1,811 
Greece 2,823 3,175 4,172 3,399 3,412 2,936 3,026 3,316 2,727 2,556 2,519 2,462 2,451 2,099 .. 
Hungary 2,114 2,293 2,236 2,33 2,316 2,208 2,171 2,115 2,344 2,804 2,637 2,26 1,239 1,214 1,302 
Ireland 3,322 3,796 3,673 3,523 3,671 3,661 3,552 3,375 3,761 3,387 2,835 2,412 2,52 2,481 2,577 
Italy 2,913 3,254 2,896 3,487 3,098 2,758 2,805 2,78 3,397 3,793 3,696 3,094 2,824 2,709 2,864 
Luxembourg 7,64 6,68 6,969 7,313 8,031 7,328 5,725 5,79 4,955 5,272 5,36 5,76 5,79 5,04 5,081 
Netherlands 4,221 4,053 4,004 3,926 3,309 2,808 3,053 3,77 3,315 3,245 3,165 2,024 2,178 2,071 .. 
Poland 2,59 2,411 2,429 1,87 2,045 1,803 2,22 2,483 2,397 2,752 2,709 2,29 1,994 2,077 .. 
Portugal 3,05 3,49 3,726 3,257 3,302 2,78 2,866 2,678 2,925 3,587 3,655 2,859 2,841 3,222 2,792 
Slovak Republic 3,238 3,1 2,608 2,593 2,516 2,753 2,595 2,726 2,907 2,987 3,123 2,511 2,519 2,411 2,477 
Slovenia 0,993 1,157 1,162 1,257 1,564 1,735 1,925 2,766 2,963 3,227 2,506 1,841 1,882 1,69 1,263 
Spain 2,411 2,741 3,06 2,82 3,191 3,074 3,395 3,856 4,138 4,672 2,826 2,236 1,776 1,819 2,173 
Sweden 2,749 2,943 3,92 2,851 2,285 2,425 3,017 3,683 3,643 3,708 2,984 2,996 3,47 3,23 3,025 
United Kingdom 3,869 3,536 3,518 3,443 2,84 2,71 2,841 3,309 3,919 3,378 3,57 2,76 3,052 3,079 2,87 
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Table 16 Statutory tax rates (OECD, 2013b) 
Country 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Austria 34,0% 34,0% 34,0% 34,0% 34,0% 34,0% 34,0% 25,0% 25,0% 25,0% 25,0% 25,0% 25,0% 25,0% 25,0% 25,0% 
Belgium 40,2% 40,2% 40,2% 40,2% 40,2% 34,0% 34,0% 34,0% 34,0% 34,0% 34,0% 34,0% 34,0% 34,0% 34,0% 34,0% 
Czech Republic 35,0% 35,0% 31,0% 31,0% 31,0% 31,0% 28,0% 26,0% 24,0% 24,0% 21,0% 20,0% 19,0% 19,0% 19,0% 19,0% 
Denmark 34,0% 32,0% 32,0% 30,0% 30,0% 30,0% 30,0% 28,0% 28,0% 25,0% 25,0% 25,0% 25,0% 25,0% 25,0% 25,0% 
Estonia 
  
26,0% 26,0% 26,0% 26,0% 26,0% 24,0% 23,0% 22,0% 21,0% 21,0% 21,0% 21,0% 21,0% 21,0% 
Finland 28,0% 28,0% 29,0% 29,0% 29,0% 29,0% 29,0% 26,0% 26,0% 26,0% 26,0% 26,0% 26,0% 26,0% 24,5% 24,5% 
France 41,7% 40,0% 37,8% 36,4% 35,4% 35,4% 35,4% 35,0% 34,4% 34,4% 34,4% 34,4% 34,4% 34,4% 34,4% 34,4% 
Germany 56,0% 52,0% 52,0% 38,9% 38,9% 40,2% 38,9% 38,9% 38,9% 38,9% 30,2% 30,2% 30,2% 30,2% 30,2% 30,2% 
Greece 40,0% 40,0% 40,0% 37,5% 35,0% 35,0% 35,0% 32,0% 29,0% 25,0% 25,0% 25,0% 24,0% 20,0% 20,0% 26,0% 
Hungary 18,0% 18,0% 18,0% 18,0% 18,0% 18,0% 16,0% 16,0% 17,3% 20,0% 20,0% 20,0% 19,0% 19,0% 19,0% 19,0% 
Ireland 32,0% 28,0% 24,0% 20,0% 16,0% 12,5% 12,5% 12,5% 12,5% 12,5% 12,5% 12,5% 12,5% 12,5% 12,5% 12,5% 
Italy 37,0% 37,0% 37,0% 36,0% 36,0% 34,0% 33,0% 33,0% 33,0% 33,0% 27,5% 27,5% 27,5% 27,5% 27,5% 27,5% 
Luxembourg 
  
37,5% 37,5% 30,4% 30,4% 30,4% 30,4% 29,6% 29,6% 29,6% 28,6% 28,6% 28,8% 28,8% 29,2% 
Netherlands 35,0% 35,0% 35,0% 35,0% 34,5% 34,5% 34,5% 31,5% 29,6% 25,5% 25,5% 25,5% 25,5% 25,0% 25,0% 25,0% 
Poland 36,0% 34,0% 30,0% 28,0% 28,0% 27,0% 19,0% 19,0% 19,0% 19,0% 19,0% 19,0% 19,0% 19,0% 19,0% 19,0% 
Portugal 37,4% 37,4% 35,2% 35,2% 33,0% 33,0% 27,5% 27,5% 27,5% 26,5% 26,5% 26,5% 26,5% 26,5% 31,5% 31,5% 
Slovak Republic 40,0% 40,0% 29,0% 29,0% 25,0% 25,0% 19,0% 19,0% 19,0% 19,0% 19,0% 19,0% 19,0% 19,0% 19,0% 23,0% 
Slovenia 
  
25,0% 25,0% 25,0% 25,0% 25,0% 25,0% 25,0% 23,0% 22,0% 21,0% 20,0% 20,0% 20,0% 17,0% 
Spain 35,0% 35,0% 35,0% 35,0% 35,0% 35,0% 35,0% 35,0% 35,0% 32,5% 30,0% 30,0% 30,0% 30,0% 30,0% 30,0% 
Sweden     28,0% 28,0% 28,0% 28,0% 28,0% 28,0% 28,0% 28,0% 28,0% 28,0% 28,0% 26,3% 26,3% 26,3% 26,3% 22,0% 
United Kingdom 31,0% 30,0% 30,0% 30,0% 30,0% 30,0% 30,0% 30,0% 30,0% 30,0% 28,0% 28,0% 28,0% 26,0% 24,0% 23,0% 
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Table 17 Tax revenues as a percentage of total taxation (OECD, 2013b) 
Country 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Austria 4,822 4,053 4,633 6,778 5,021 4,956 5,224 5,247 5,229 5,785 5,753 3,994 4,586 5,246 5,281 
Belgium 7,497 7,173 7,173 6,977 6,775 6,472 6,953 7,433 8,002 7,996 7,6 5,649 6,038 6,584 6,855 
Czech Republic 9,685 10,648 9,873 11,294 11,919 12,397 12,166 12,056 12,921 13,089 12,094 10,507 9,964 9,714 10,022 
Denmark 6,094 4,742 6,6 5,748 6,002 6,045 6,447 7,716 8,753 7,734 6,885 4,868 5,826 5,798 6,324 
Estonia 7,143 5,993 2,86 2,27 3,572 5,138 5,447 4,657 4,858 5,168 5,149 5,19 3,964 3,84 4,457 
Finland 9,351 9,431 12,484 9,361 9,329 7,715 8,093 7,593 7,733 9,01 8,124 4,732 6,001 6,252 4,964 
France 5,969 6,549 6,915 7,651 6,608 5,749 6,361 5,499 6,719 6,826 6,738 3,458 4,981 5,718 5,624 
Germany 4,356 4,77 4,834 1,66 2,859 3,547 4,438 5,129 6,122 6,245 5,374 3,737 4,335 4,736 4,817 
Greece 8,732 9,565 12,15 10,233 10,077 9,087 9,608 10,317 8,624 7,871 7,849 8,074 7,746 6,524 .. 
Hungary 5,549 5,892 5,694 6,068 6,099 5,823 5,766 5,667 6,286 6,954 6,571 5,67 3,258 3,276 3,346 
Ireland 10,629 12,108 11,903 12,218 13,238 13,004 12,001 11,204 11,903 10,884 9,699 8,741 9,205 8,89 9,111 
Italy 7,037 7,698 6,897 8,366 7,54 6,64 6,881 6,85 8,073 8,782 8,589 7,132 6,574 6,299 6,448 
Luxembourg 19,4 17,449 17,807 18,397 20,428 19,222 15,33 15,407 13,816 14,796 14,357 14,752 15,507 13,624 13,458 
Netherlands 10,812 10,115 10,117 10,302 8,837 7,619 8,2 9,814 8,48 8,377 8,067 5,302 5,593 5,372 .. 
Poland 7,279 6,875 7,416 5,743 6,184 5,536 7,013 7,525 7,053 7,914 7,91 7,214 6,29 6,43 .. 
Portugal 10,16 11,348 12,078 10,622 10,568 8,838 9,466 8,625 9,211 11,045 11,231 9,311 9,094 9,763 8,597 
Slovak Republic 8,815 8,767 7,651 7,833 7,573 8,327 8,193 8,66 9,875 10,134 10,596 8,637 8,904 8,389 8,707 
Slovenia 2,642 3,052 3,115 3,352 4,133 4,561 5,048 7,163 7,745 8,568 6,761 4,976 4,937 4,56 3,38 
Spain 7,255 8,028 8,92 8,317 9,273 9,028 9,733 10,699 11,211 12,529 8,526 7,229 5,464 5,658 6,612 
Sweden 5,42 5,763 7,62 5,774 4,815 5,076 6,278 7,535 7,539 7,831 6,427 6,434 7,64 7,31 6,829 
United Kingdom 10,952 9,895 9,668 9,515 8,153 7,87 8,138 9,339 10,805 9,449 9,968 8,077 8,757 8,613 8,142 
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